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ABSTRACT

This booklet contains the proceedings of a conference that focused on the psychological and fiscal impact of the electronic media in the 1984 election campaign. Comments are made by Robert Teeter, the principal pollster for the national Republican party, and Peter Hart, the principal pollster for the national Democratic party. Both describe their parties' strategies for winning the 1984 election and discuss the use of polling results in modifying or strengthening existing strategies. Their comments are augmented by four journalists, all of whom have many years of experience in political campaign reporting. They include (1) Jeff Alderman, director of the polling unit at ABC news, (2) Fred Barnes, national political reporter for the "Baltimore Sun," (3) Adam Clymer, polling editor for the "New York Times," and (4) John Mashek, political writer for "U.S. News and World Report." Interspersed are comments by Bill Moyers, senior news analyst for CBS news, who served as conference moderator. (HOD)

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Election 84:
SEARCH FOR A NEW COALITION

Proceedings of The Allan Shivers Election Analysis Conference

November 17, 1984

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Dedication

The Allan Shivers Election Analysis Conference was one of the last public appearances of Governor Allan Shivers before his death on January 14, 1985. We are gratified that the Governor, delighted with this conference, eagerly anticipated the 1985 conference being planned to investigate the role and future of journalism in an entertainment medium.

We dedicate this volume to his memory.

Tracor, Inc. is pleased to underwrite the publication of this book as a gift to The University of Texas College of Communication, in particular because it is dedicated to Governor Allan Shivers. Shivers' contributions to the College and to the Headliners Club Foundation will have a lasting impact on the quality of journalism in Texas.

Frank W. McBee, Jr.
Chairman and President
Tracor, Inc.

Preface

In 1980, the voters in the United States rejected a one-term Democratic president to elect a Republican whom the press would soon label the "Great Communicator." The term, misleading from the perspective of any communication purist, simply means that President Ronald Reagan is an effective performer on television. He has used this dominant news medium with an actor's skill.

During the President's first term, "supply-side economics" became a household phrase. The supply-side policies of the Reagan Administration have become associated with significant decreases in interest and inflation rates, both of which had soared under the Carter Administration. However, while interest and inflation rates declined, unemployment in the United States during the first Reagan term reached levels not experienced since the Great Depression; American soldiers were killed on foreign soil; the country experienced the largest fiscal deficit in history; and the U.S. trade deficit reached a record high.

The record of the Reagan Administration presented tantalizing issues for the Democratic candidate nominated to run against the President in 1984. Indeed, the Democratic presidential candidate, former Vice-President Walter Mondale, hoping to entice voters to reinstate a Democratic administration, attempted to exploit the foreign and domestic policy failures of the Reagan Administration. On television, however, Mondale was no match for President Reagan. Mondale was not, by the standards of American TV viewers, a great, or even acceptable communicator. The public perceived him as a dull speaker with a midwestern twang.

Anticipating the psychological and fiscal impact of the electronic media in the 1984 campaign (over $100,000,000 was spent by both parties in media programming), the College of Communication at UT Austin began plans in 1983 for the first annual Allan Shivers communication policy conference. The College enlisted the assistance of Robert Teeter, the principal pollster for the national Republican party, and Peter Hart, the principal pollster for the national Democratic party. On the pages that follow, both Teeter and Hart describe their parties' strategies for winning the '84 election and discuss the use of polling results in modifying or strengthening existing strategies.

To augment and expand the Hart/Teeter commentary, the College sought the aid of four journalists, all of whom have many years of experience in political campaign reporting: Jeff Alderman, director of the polling unit at ABC News; Fred Barnes, national political reporter for the Baltimore *Sun*; Adam Clymer, polling editor for *The New York Times*; and John Mashek, political writer for *U.S. News & World Report*. These journalists brought to the conference a view of

the 1984 election from the vantage of veteran observers of the political scene. Bill Moyers, senior news analyst for CBS, moderated the conference with skill, keeping the dialogue moving briskly. He also added insights of an experienced political analyst.

The conference participants discussed not only the strategies and issues directly involved in the election of the President in 1984, but examined larger political issues and the future of the two major parties in the United States. The panel examined several major questions: Why did a staggering majority of the voting public cast ballots for a candidate with a reputation for inaccuracy in reporting facts to support his positions? Was President Reagan's TV personality the major factor in his victory? Why did the Republican candidate so overwhelmingly capture traditional Democratic strongholds? What effect did Geraldine Ferraro's selection have on the election and on the role of women in future presidential campaigns? What role did the Moral Majority play in the election and what role might it play in the future? Was the 1984 election a search for a new coalition by both parties?

We encourage our readers to enjoy the political insights, hindsights and foresights set forth in this volume in the non-partisan spirit which infused the conference.

ALLAN SHIVERS
1907-1985

Allan Shivers received a BA degree in 1931 in Government and an LLB in 1933, both from The University of Texas at Austin. He was elected Student-Body President in 1932.

He served in state government from 1934 until 1957 as Senator, Lieutenant Governor and Governor.

Governor Shivers' contributions to education have been recognized by his selection for Distinguished Alumnus Award from The University of Texas at Austin and honorary degrees from six other institutions. He served as Chairman of the Law School Foundation and as a past member and Chairman of The University of Texas System Board of Regents.

He also served as Senior Chairman of the Board of Austin Bancshares Corporation and contributed wisdom and experience to a number of financial institutions throughout his career.

To recognize Governor Shivers for his many contributions to government, business and education, the Allan Shivers Centennial Chair in Communication was established on February 12, 1982, by the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System. The Chair was made possible by a gift from Houston Endowment Inc. and the Board of Regents Teachers and Scholars Program.

This conference in his name is the first of an annual series planned to explore policy issues related to the interrelationships of government, business and the communication media.

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Introduction

DEAN ROBERT JEFFREY: Good morning. Governor Shivers, honored guests, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of The University of Texas at Austin and the College of Communication, I welcome you in the auditorium and those on the National Public Radio Network to the Allan Shivers Post-Election Analysis Conference, 1984.

Thirty-six years ago, I was fortunate to be a student at the University of Iowa when George Gallup returned to his alma mater to explain what happened in the polling process during the 1948 presidential campaign. Sitting in the Old Capitol on the Iowa campus, I wondered then whether polling techniques could be developed that would accurately predict outcomes of elections. Since that time, polling techniques have become extremely sophisticated and accurate, so accurate, as a matter of fact, that more than one wag has suggested that we could save millions of dollars in tax money by cancelling the voting process and simply permitting the polls to tell us what candidates we will elect.

The sociological, economic, and political impact of polling, beyond simply predicting outcomes of elections, has raised a number of questions that we hope will be addressed by our distinguished participants this morning.

We have asked Governor Allan Shivers to open our conference. Governor Shivers served in public life as an elected official for over 20 years, first in the Texas State Senate, then as lieutenant governor and finally as governor of Texas from 1949 to 1957. He has chaired the National Governors Conference and the Southern Governors Conference, was president of the Council of State Governments, and chairman of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission. In addition to his political activities, Governor Shivers is a lawyer, farmer, rancher, and businessman.

Governor Shivers has been a benefactor of The University of Texas at Austin for many years, having served as member and chairman of the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System and as a member of the Committee of 75 in 1958 and the Centennial Commission of The University of Texas at Austin in 1983. He has been an active supporter of the College of Communication, and we are proud to have the opportunity to honor Governor Shivers by designating this conference in his name. I am pleased to introduce to you Governor Allan Shivers. (Applause)

GOVERNOR ALLAN SHIVERS: Thank you very much Dr. Jeffrey. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am deeply honored that this conference, the first of its kind at The University of Texas, has been named in my honor. I think it very worthwhile that The University in its reach for excellence conduct a symposium of this kind where students and citizens can come and listen to the real experts on how polling of elections is conducted; and then hear more experts describe the whys and wherefores, the causes and the reasons for the results. All of us are interested in elections. They mean much in the way we live and in the way our children are going to live tomorrow. I'm delighted to be here with you. Thank you very much. (Applause)

DEAN ROBERT JEFFREY: Thank you. Governor Shivers.

It is now my pleasure to introduce our moderator for this morning's conference. Bill Moyers is senior news analyst for CBS News and executive editor of CBS Reports in New York City. Although born in Oklahoma, Mr. Moyers was reared in Marshall, Texas, and we claim him as a Texan. He earned his Bachelor of Journalism degree from The University of Texas at Austin in 1956. After interning in the Senate offices of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, he became President Johnson's executive assistant, administra-

tive chief of the White House staff, special assistant, and then press secretary to President Johnson.

Mr. Moyers has won so many of journalism's highest awards that it would take half an hour to simply list them. Perhaps the one he is proudest of is the Ralph Lowell Award for Extraordinary Contributions to Public Television. Most recently, other than his involvement with the political campaign, we have enjoyed his Public Broadcasting program, *A Walk Through The 20th Century With Bill Moyers*.

There are many reasons for Mr. Moyers to return to Austin. He serves as a consultant to Cox Enterprises, owners of the *Austin American-Statesman*, he serves as a member of the College of Communication Foundation Advisory Council, and, as announced earlier this week, he will be the first Student Endowed Centennial Lecturer at The University of Texas at Austin next April. Mr. Moyers is a man I often refer to as the conscience of electronic journalism and we are pleased that he has sufficient attachments to Austin to return to us often. Mr. Bill Moyers. (Applause)

Moyers

BILL MOYERS: Thank you very much, Dean. Despite having been around the scene for twenty years now, it still helps to be exuberantly introduced.

This summer, when Charles Kuralt and I had completed a series for CBS called *Crossroads*, I left immediately after the final broadcast to come to Marshall to visit my parents. These three events happened in sequence on that one trip. When the cab pulled up at La Guardia and the porter was taking the bags out of the trunk, he noticed the name, recognized it, and said, "Don't I see you regularly on a soap opera?" (Laughter) Dan Rather was not amused when I told him that story. When I reached the gate to wait for the Delta flight to Shreveport, Louisiana, which is the nearest airport to my home, an elderly woman came up to me and stared me squarely in the eyes and said, "I know you, who are you?" (Laughter) And, so help me, when I got off the plane in Shreveport, another woman came up to me and said, "Oh, Mr. Kuralt, I love your work, but you look different in person than you do on television." (Laughter) And I said, "That's right, on television I have less hair and more weight." And she said, "That's all right, I love both of you Sunday night on that program called *90 Minutes* with Mickey Rooney." (Laughter) So much for notoriety.

Governor Shivers, I want to thank you and the College of Communication for making this occasion possible. Over the year, I began to get the feeling that the only reason we were going to have an election was to find out if the polls were right. We did, and they were. Of course, an election signifies a

great deal more than who won and who lost. A journalist or a political scientist will tell you that there are many ways to take the measure of a country. Three of the most significant I've found over the years include, first of all, the gross national product, the sum of a nation's goods and services; second, the gross national psychology, the sum of our hopes and fears; and third, and partly a combination of the first two, the gross national profile, which we draw of ourselves every ten years in the census and reveal in our national elections every four years.

Far more than deciding who will lead us in the White House or the Congress, an election is a kind of wide-angle-lens snapshot of our collective behavior at a given constitutionally mandated moment. When I was growing up here in Texas there was the story of the fellow who was running for statewide office whose campaign manager called him and said, "Jim, we need you in Dallas." And Jim, the candidate, said, "I can't go to Dallas, I'm on my way to Houston." The campaign manager said, "Jim, you've got to come to Dallas, they are telling lies about you in Dallas." And the candidate replied, " But they are telling the truth about me in Houston." (Laughter)

An election, Governor Shivers, is something like that. A revelation in a rough kind of way of the fictions, myths, and meanings that give shape to the public will. When General DeGaulle came to power in 1958, France had not yet recovered from the calamity of defeat in 1940 by the Germans, and it was still lacerated nearly to civil war by the question of Algeria, its colony. One of DeGaulle's supporters, in a marvelous biography of the general, wrote, "General DeGaulle revealed to us that the attitude with which one approaches a difficulty is more important than the actual result; that a people's will is more significant than its present circumstance; that the collective consciousness needs to distinguish, to see in the half light of history, a few clear points, a few simple notions, and that this clarity and simplicity must have a galvanic power which leads to the power of self-transcendence." It is the search for those simple but galvanic notions of clarity that makes the analysis of an election endlessly fascinating to those of us who fish in the streams of public opinion.

No election in my adult lifetime has offered the kind of food for thought served up in this one. Ronald Reagan, as he was in Hollywood, is a politician clearly of the happy ending. And, in one sense, one can say that for the last twenty years we have had in this country a running, dramatic series of disorders that hung like a cloud over the collective political awareness of the nation. America lost a war. America seemed to lose control of its economy. And many Americans lost faith in well-intentioned, but often poorly managed programs. And by 1979 there was a feeling in the country of what Jimmy Carter called a malaise, a feeling of melancholy.

The elevator man in my building in New York is a hispanic. On the morning of the election, as I came home from an all-night stint at CBS, I asked, "How did it go for you, Jose?" He said, "It went well, my man won." And I said, "Why did you vote for the President?" And he said, "Because I remember four years ago." "What did you remember about four years ago?" "I remember," said he, this middle-aged man who had come to this country from the Dominican Republic in 1965, "I remember that my oldest son almost didn't make it into medical school because of the rising cost of tuition." And he said, "I remember the mobs shouting at our embassy in Iran." He said, "The President has made me, a poor man, feel proud again."

That struck me as a metaphor for the happy ending that so many people

have wanted to this twenty years, two decades of melancholy: John F. Kennedy elected and assassinated, Lyndon Johnson elected and discredited, Richard Nixon elected and disgraced, Ford appointed and defeated, Carter elected and rejected. Not since 1960, as the now cliché goes, has a president left the White House with the esteem and good will of the American people.

So this was a remarkable election whose meaning we will be sorting out for a long time to come. Ninety-two million Americans turned out on November 6. And as we look back at it, what were the forces that shaped their behavior and what shape does their decision give to the future? These are the questions we shall pursue this morning, first with our two distinguished pollsters and then with a panel of my colleagues in journalism.

Peter Hart has been in the game for twenty years. Looking at him you must conclude that he started when he was about five years old. (Laughter) He does appear too young to be one of the wise men of the business. But his firm, which he heads, has conducted more than 1,000 public opinion surveys in that time, not only in politics but in such areas as American attitudes toward developing nations, nonvoting in America, the role of television in the 1980s, and attitudes about cable television. He has served and is serving in this election as a consultant to CBS News as a colleague of those of us at CBS News to assist us in our own efforts to analyze the election; a consultant to *The Wall Street Journal* on political coverage; and he has worked with Dan Rather now for five years on national elections. His list of clients includes one of the oldest senators in Washington, John Stennis, and a senator you know well, Lloyd Bentsen. Over the years, his clients have included Jennings Randolph, Hubert Humphrey, John Glenn, Morris Udall, Ernest Hollings, Jay Rockefeller, Robert Kennedy, Bill Bradley, and others. This year he was selected by Walter Mondale to conduct the polling and provide strategic analysis for Mr. Mondale's campaign. Outside of politics, so that you know that these men do not live their lives wholly in plumbing the minds of the electorate, he has performed studies in the fields of media research, education, employee attitudes, law, housing, economic development, tourism, and jury selection. He has said about his own profession that the pollster who tries to tailor results of his polls to his client's hopes is the pollster who's in business for one season. Peter Hart has been in business for many seasons because he's a man of integrity and a craftsman of the first order. Peter Hart. (Applause)

PETER HART: Thank you very much. I'm delighted to be with you this morning. Let me just say that this is a postwar report from General Custer's pollster after the Little Big Horn. (Laughter) The results are in, and it went a little less well than expected. But let me assure you that, because I understand the turmoil and uncertainty that a country can go through if there is a national recount, we will not be asking for a national recount this year.

Let me talk a little bit about 1984 and start by talking about the cards the Democrats were dealt, because in every election you start out with a mood; you start out with an environment in which you try to run a campaign and from which you try to make a strategy. And to start out in 1984, we were looking at a country where the mood was more optimistic than it had been in, probably twenty years. There was more of a sense of unity; there was more of a sense of togetherness. And a standard question that both Bob (Teeter) and I have been asking, and the person that Bill referred to in his building was really saying, is, "How do you sense the mood of this country? Do you think things are headed in the right direction, or are they seriously off on the wrong track?"

When we asked that question in June, we found that 44% of the people said that things were headed in the right direction and about 44% said things were seriously off on the wrong track. You may say that that's a divided mood, but it was different compared to when Jimmy Carter ran in 1980, when about 20% to 25% said that things were headed in the right direction

and 65% said things were seriously off on the wrong track. Even going back to 1976 with Gerald Ford, more people said things were headed in the wrong direction or off on the wrong track.

There was more of a sense of confidence in 1984, and that confidence built throughout the election. In fact, in October we checked this once again, and 58% of the voters said that things were headed in the right direction and only 28% said that they were seriously off on the wrong track. And that's the highest I can remember seeing except for little blips during the period of the last 15 years. So the mood was a sense of much greater confidence, of much greater buoyancy.

The second thing we were dealing with was attitudes toward Ronald Reagan. As you all know, the public perceives him as an immensely popular individual. In fact, what we found was that about 70% of the voters personally liked him and only 27% of the voters personally disliked him. We have some standard questions we ask of governors, senators, etc., and those are "Would you vote to re-elect this person? Would you vote against this person, or, would you consider someone else?" And what we found for Ronald Reagan is that 43% of the American public said in June they would vote to re-elect him, approximately 29% said they would vote to replace Ronald Reagan, and the remaining 28% said they would consider someone else or were not sure. The importance of this is that it meant Ronald Reagan started with a hard base of about 43% of the voters. That is obviously a good size of the electorate to start with. Against that, an opponent, in this case Walter Mondale, started approximately 29% behind.

The ability to win meant that Mondale needed three out of every four people who said they would consider someone else, or that they were open to some kind of persuasion. When we asked voters if they agreed with most of Ronald Reagan's policies, or disagreed with many of his policies, we found that about 46% said they liked many of his policies, and about 50% said that they did not like many of his policies. So there was more of a split on a policy level, less on a personal level.

When the electorate talked about Reagan's qualities, there were five things that came through that were very important in trying to frame a campaign against him. Number one, he instilled pride in America. The voters believed in that, they believed in him and they saw him as exemplifying that quality. Second, they perceived him as a strong leader. Third, they saw him as tough and as a person who couldn't be pushed around. They also saw him, fourth, as a warm and friendly human being and, fifth, as a religious person, a person who believes in God. Those were the five special qualities that he had and the bond he had with the electorate.

Against that, on the negative side, the electorate perceived him as not fighting for the middle class. That was probably the biggest beef or concern with him. Second, they saw him as not being compassionate or caring about the needy. Third, they had questions about his ability to get people to work together and to cooperate. And, fourth, they had a question about him in relation to fairness, again coming back to the compassion factor. So, on the positive side there was a whole series of leadership qualities and the direction the country was headed. On the negative side there was a question of fairness, compassion and fighting for the middle class.

There were three issues going with the President. First of all, he was in favor of a strong defense. Basically, that was a selling attribute. Second, they perceived that he had brought about good economic conditions and, third,

that he represented traditional values. So, on an issue agenda, that's where he was perceived as being strongest. The electorate had doubts about Ronald Reagan in three areas. They had doubts over his concern about Social Security and about Medicare and that he might make cuts. Second, they thought that his policies were unfair to the poor and the needy. In June, when we conducted this poll again, a bench mark survey to give a sort of "lay of the land" for the general election, the electorate was concerned about his policies in Central America. So, it was strong defense versus the policies in Central America, good economic conditions versus cutting Social Security, and traditional values versus his not being compassionate to the poor.

That was the situation the Democrats and Walter Mondale faced for 1984. Those were the cards that were dealt and, as Bob Teeter said to me back in May, having gone through this with Gerald Ford in 1976, "You're playing to the worst hand of all. You're playing to an inside straight." And, indeed, what we needed to do in this campaign was to figure out how you put together the best hand given the cards that were there.

We aimed at three basic strategies in 1984. The first thing was to try to make this an election which was a referendum about the future, because, while people were content with the way things were going at the present, they were also concerned about the way things were headed in the future. We thought the more we could make that the choice, the stronger our position. Second, we needed to develop Walter Mondale's profile on the leadership dimension, because, while Ronald Reagan was very strong, voters did not perceive Walter Mondale as a strong leader. That was an important area to develop. Third, we needed to force the agenda into the areas where Ronald Reagan was most vulnerable. That obviously was the Social Security, Medicare, and fairness issues; the war and peace issue; arms control in Central America; and the threats to economic growth, which meant the deficits, fair trade, and job creation. That's what we were handed in terms of where the campaign went.

Obviously, it's there for everyone to view. When we compared notes with Richard Workman and Robert Teeter after the campaign, we saw three different phases. The first phase was the Democratic Convention phase where Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro moved up, and moved up dramatically in a short period of time. The second I would call the Olympic—Ferraro finance phase, where America saw a tremendous sense of pride in the Olympics. It was our Olympics. I thought it was a terribly important event. At the same time, Geraldine Ferraro went from being a very special person to being another politician under siege with the financial disclosure. And the third phase was the general election part, which could be divided into two periods. September tended to be much more Reagan's month and not as good a month for the Mondale campaign, although he came out of September about 15 points down, which is approximately where it ended up. The first debate phase, in which Ronald Reagan did not look good, was the one period where we found the election close to within 10 points. About the 15th of October we had it at 52 to 42. During a similar period of time, Richard Workman had it at 52 to 40. That changed after the second debate. A fascinating thing happened as we saw it. On Sunday night, after the debate, we polled and had Mondale behind by approximately 12 points. We came out of that debate on Monday and polled again and found Walter Mondale down by 20 points, 57 to 37. During that 24 hours the question marks and uncertainties about Ronald Reagan seemed to have been erased.

Let me briefly, in the time remaining, talk about what I think this election was not about and what I think it was about. The first thing that it was not about is that Ronald Reagan did not win this election on personality alone. And Walter Mondale did not lose it because he did not have a strong television personality. We make a mistake if we bring the election in that narrow, and think that how they projected themselves was the most important factor. It really was not. There was much more going on. Second, as much as some of the pundits would like to cover this as a left-right choice, I don't think it really was for the electorate. The fact of the matter is that I don't think Ronald Reagan won simply on the basis of his being conservative or that Walter Mondale lost because he was perceived as a liberal. Third, Reagan voters told us the weekend before the election that they did not want their vote to be interpreted in certain ways. Number one, they didn't want their vote to be interpreted as opposition to abortion and ERA. They also did not want their vote to be interpreted as continuing to support increases in military spending and, third, they did not want their vote to be interpreted as support for additional cuts in domestic spending. So, while they went along with Ronald Reagan in many areas, those are three areas in which they didn't.

In terms of the questions left out of these responses and what this election means, I think that there are challenges to both parties. The first challenge that comes out of this election is that the Democrats, who once held a 20-point advantage in terms of party identification, must recognize those days are over. Whether or not we are in a period of realignment, what is important is that the one-party domination for the Democrats is not there. Certainly, in the Sunbelt states, among younger voters and among white-collar and sales workers, the Democrats have a job to do.

The Republicans also have a challenge ahead. Yes, they won on the national level and, indeed, in selected states they made gains on the state level. They have to be able to translate what they have been able to do at the top of the ticket down to the state level, and that becomes their challenge ahead.

But we are in a period of competitive politics, and the second challenge relates to the fact that this election didn't give us a prescription for economic growth for the future. In other words, Ronald Reagan won on the current economic conditions rather than on the future economic growth questions. Which party is able to project that and provide the growth will have the upper hand in the next era.

The third challenge for both parties is the ability to project a national vision of where they are going and to get beyond the special interests of their constituent groups. For the Democrats that means the ability to go beyond labor, blacks, and the poor. For the Republicans, the challenge is equally important. If they get captured by the New Right with its private agenda of morality causes, they threaten to step on the progressive attitudes of the young people and the upscale voters they won in 1984. So both parties will have to move away from constituent groups and go for a national vision.

The fourth challenge goes to both parties as well. The Democrats have to prove that they not only have the compassion to care, but the toughness to govern. For the Republicans, the reverse is true. They have to prove not only that they have the toughness to govern, but that they have the compassion to care.

Finally, there is a whole host of issues which will take on new realities and new meanings, and which will have to be dealt with differently, whether it's

foreign policy, taxes, race, or budget deficits. I think that the only thing we can definitely say, ten days out from this election, is that in 1984 we ended an era of American politics. The final chapter of the New Deal coalition is over. It's over because the voters in the big cities are no longer there in the numbers they were. It's over because two-thirds of the blue-collar workers have family incomes of over $20,000 and the labor unions are a shrinking portion of the electorate. The Democrats can win in 1988, but they will have to go beyond their old coalition and put together a new coalition. The same challenges face the Republicans in the future. The advice I would offer both parties comes from Thomas Wolfe in *You Can't Go Home Again*, in which he wrote, just three years prior to Franklin Roosevelt's assuming office: "You can't go home again, back home to the escapes of time and memory, back home to the old forms and systems, things that once seemed everlasting but are changing all the time. You can't go home again. The home to every one of us is in the future. There is no other way." Thank you very much. (Applause)

MOYERS: Peter, let me ask you some very specific questions before we move on, just to lay some groundwork for later. One of the most vivid images in my mind of the campaign came in Mississippi when Walter Mondale strolled out onto a high school football playing field where the team was practicing and he tried to engage some of the players in a discussion about the deficits. One of the high school players said to him, "Mr. Mondale, I'm more concerned about the next football game than I am about the deficits," and turned and walked off. Why was he not able to catch on in talking to people about the deficits and turn that into a positive cutting issue for him?

HART: Well, I think that the deficit issue was there and was something that voters were concerned about, certainly not to the level that they were about the jobs issue. And there was a perception that there were good economic times. But against that, one of the difficulties, and that brings us to a central issue, is that, in order to get a handle on the deficit, Walter Mondale made the statement about taxes. And, instead of being able to follow up and really put it into context where we would talk about a trust fund, we were talking about tax reform and a whole series of fair tax proposals. The Republicans, artfully so, really nailed Walter Mondale, and the rest of the ticket to a lesser extent, on the actual issue of taxes. Taxes became the dominant issue, certainly during late September and early October, and the deficit as an issue faded. It was harder to get a handle on it.

MOYERS: Governor Shivers was saying last night that he might vote for a man who was going to raise his taxes, but he wouldn't vote for a man who told him he was going to raise his taxes. (Laughter) Why did you urge Walter Mondale to make that statement at the Democratic National Convention?

HART: I'm becoming a fan of Allan Shivers, and I promise you we won't make that mistake again. The fact was that, I think.....

MOYERS: There really isn't a good answer, right? (Laughter)

HART: Right, there isn't a good answer. And I'd love to tell you that we were of the opinion that we wanted to get out in front on taxes. But, having made the statement, the important thing that wasn't done was to follow through on this and to be able to frame it and bring it back to Ronald Reagan and say "If you're not going to raise taxes, you're going to make cuts"; and to force him to deal with the cuts. Ronald Reagan was able, basically, to slip that punch and he was never asked the tough questions.

MOYERS: Did Ferraro help or hurt the ticket?

HART: Adam Clymer is going to join us in a bit and he's done some special studying on that, and what I would say is that Geraldine Ferraro helped. There are two things that happened. One of the advantages was that we were behind by approximately 15 points and, in a card game when you are behind, if you can get the deck to be reshuffled you have an advantage. And that was one of the things that Geraldine Ferraro did. Against that, we probably didn't get a fair evaluation of Geraldine Ferraro because of the attack on the financial disclosure issue. We really don't know how much potential there was for a woman vice-presidential candidate adding greatly to the top of the ticket. I think that the problems in August sort of took her from being a special figure into being another politician, and that made it more difficult. But overall, she was a plus.

MOYERS: You raised the issue in your analysis of strength. There is a wonderful story of the two fellows who go into the butcher business together as partners. They are prospering, making a lot of money, and one day one of them goes to a revival that is being held and he gets religion. He's born again, he's saved, and immediately tries to work on his partner who is unregenerate. He keeps after him until, finally, the partner who refuses to be born again says to the partner who is saved, "Look Fred, if I get religion, who's going to weigh the meat?" (Laughter) And the question is, to what extent was Mondale hurt by the perception that he can't weigh the meat?

HART: Well put, Bill. This is as much fun as going through an interview with Mike Wallace on *60 Minutes*. (Laughter)

MOYERS: But he gets to edit you.

HART: I didn't add that. I think there was certainly a question of understanding Walter Mondale's leadership potential. We saw it from the beginning and there was a perception that voters only knew him as though his career began with Jimmy Carter. In the absence of getting a firm sense of Walter Mondale, I think they grafted some of the shortcomings of Jimmy Carter onto Walter Mondale, and that became a basic problem.

MOYERS: We'll come back to some of these and other questions in a minute, but I'd like to turn in the next corner to the gentleman wearing the red-striped tie who, like Peter Hart, is one of the leading analysts of public opinion in America. Robert Teeter is president of Market Opinion Research in Detroit, Michigan. He manages the political division of Market Opinion Research and its Canadian subsidiary, Canadian Opinion Research. Canadian Opinion Research enjoys a reputation equal in that country to Market Opinion Research in this country. Bob directed the polling and research for the Republican presidential candidates in 1972—in case anyone has forgotten that was Richard Nixon; in 1976—and that was Gerald Ford; and a portion of the polling in the 1980 presidential campaign. He also managed the survey research for the Progressive Conservation Party in the Canadian federal elections in 1972, 1974, and 1979, each of which candidate I've forgotten. His clients include the Republican National Committee, the Congressional Committee, the Republican Senatorial Committee, and several state committees. With Peter, he enjoys the distinction of having the other eldest member of the United States Senate, Strom Thurmond from North Carolina. I think that Strom Thurmond is the only man ever to be nominated on three different tickets: Democratic, Republican, and Dixiecrat, in my time at least. Bob, with Market Opinion Research, has done some pioneering work in a subject we're going to discuss later concerning the techniques of polling, in the area of targeting demographic and geographic groups, finding out what's on their mind, and then

finding out how to reach them. That is proving to be to many people both a remarkable development in American political life and a disturbing one in some respects, but we will talk about that later. He's a member of the American Political Science Association and the Economic Club of Detroit. He serves on the board of directors for the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Roper Center, and Alvin College, and is president of the National Association of Political Pollsters. Robert Teeter. (Applause)



Teeter

ROBERT TEETER: Thank you, Bill. I think this election more than anything else proves to me that for something to be important it doesn't have to be very complex. If you take the longer view of this election, I think it was probably one of the most significant elections in our political system in the last fifty years. If you take the short-term view of it, and simply try to look at the campaign as Peter Hart described a few minutes ago, then nothing happened. If you look at the polling data between Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale last January, look at it at two or three points between January and the election, almost nothing happened. It remained almost exactly the same. There was very little dynamic in the campaign. Peter referred to two or three little blips that occurred in the campaign at the time of the debates and at the time of the Democratic Convention. But, by and large, most Americans didn't change their opinion of the two candidates and didn't change their

voting intention from last January on through the election on November 6.

The question that you have all read about and talked about and heard about, I assume, is the whole question of whether this was really a realigning election in the United States. I think that there is no question, and really hasn't been much since 1980, and probably since back 10 or 12 years ago, that we are in the midst of a major political realignment in this country. We are not done with it, so it is difficult to see exactly where it is going to come out. But, certainly, it is well under way. We have seen, as Peter has said, the absolute end of the New Deal coalition that has governed this country, by and large, for 50 years. We don't know exactly where this one is going to come out. It's going to take at least the 1988 election and, probably, even the 1992 election to tell. Right now, 1988 appears to be the most significant one.

When you look at the way our political systems have emerged, we have had five majority coalitions in the history of this country. Most of them, virtually all of them, have lasted about 25 or 35 years. And each time they have changed and broken up, and we've had an intervening period and then re-formed a new majority coalition, I think that history shows us that there are three or four characteristics that all of them have had. First, there has been some kind of change in the size or the composition of the electorate. Second, there has been present some kind of basic social or economic conflict that has caused the previous governing coalition to break up. Third, the new coalition has always had fairly substantial vestiges of the one that just preceded it. And last, we're not talking about majority coalitions. What it takes to govern the country really is a plurality coalition. We don't have to have 50% or 55% adherence to one party. We simply have to have more than the other party to enable either party to win most elections.

The most recent coalition which was put together in the 1930s, was made up of blacks and other minorities, blue-collar workers, union members, liberals, and Southern whites. It began to break up, I believe, just about when its life span indicated it would, in the middle to late 1960s. That coalition, if you look at it, always had a difficult time holding itself together when it became divided over civil rights. And that occurred increasingly in the late 1950s and 1960s. It always had a difficult time when it had internal divisions on foreign policy issues, which occurred not only within the Democratic Party, but also within the Republican Party and within the country over Vietnam in the late 1960s. I think those two things mask a third fault line that developed through that coalition at the same time. After the Great Society programs of the Johnson administration in the middle 1960s, there began some serious and deep divisions over the whole issue of government spending, the role of government spending and government assistance in non-means- tested programs that we have come to know as the entitlements. And so, by the end of the 1960s, that coalition had, I think, three fairly substantial fault lines develop in it. Again, it was about 30 or 35 years old, and probably about to break up. In 1972, 1973 and 1974, Watergate came along and the Republicans did what the Democrats wouldn't do, and that was to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.

At the same time, during this same period of the late 60s and 70s, we had two other types of fairly significant changes in our country. Both, I think, meet the qualifications for realignment. One is, we had a very substantial demographic change. This was the era where the much-talked-about baby boom-voter generation came of voting age. The lead edge of the baby-boom voters was beginning to come into the electorate in the late '60s and early

'70s. We also dropped the voting age in 1972 to eighteen, which gave us an even greater potential to bring those people in. And at the same time, we were beginning to change the level of education of our electorate in a remarkable way.

The second demographic change since 1971 or 1972 is that the number of our population who have less than a high school education has decreased at almost a percent a year, and the number of people who have some post-secondary education has increased at almost a percent a year. So what we are doing is developing a whole new voting class, a very well educated middle-class electorate, in much larger numbers than we have ever had in the history of this country.

The ages I mentioned earlier changed very rapidly. In 1972, in President Nixon's re-election, 52% of our population were under 30 years of age. By 1984 that has dropped to 38%. At the same time, we were getting, at a much slower rate, the movement of our population away from the Northeast and Midwest to the Sunbelt states, to the South and the Southwest. Just between Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 and his re-election this year, 17 electoral votes moved from the Northeast and the Midwest with reapportionment in 1981 to the South and the Southwest. Had this been a close election, that's a good middle-sized state, those 17 electoral votes. That is going to continue, and probably at an increasing rate, to 1991 and the year 2000. Those demographic and population changes are occurring, but, I think, at a somewhat slower rate than has generally been talked about.

My point is that this left us, by 1980, with two situations. We had a tremendous social and economic conflict in our country for 10 or 15 years, a very difficult time. Second, we had a group of baby-boom voters coming of age who, because of their cynicism during this period, didn't vote. And so we had developed, outside the electorate, this very large bloc of potential voters eligible to vote who weren't voting. They looked like they were all ready to come into the electorate, and that has been one of the qualifications and one of the criteria for the realignment occurring. In each of the five previous party systems, we've seen the electorate expand significantly, and that realignment has been fueled not only by people switching parties, but in a very large way by bringing people into the electorate who had not been there before.

Nineteen eighty represented, at least many of us thought, the final blow of that New Deal coalition. But because we were defeating at that time, in 1980, an unpopular Democratic president, there was a lot of questioning as to whether people were voting for something new, or simply unseating an unpopular Democratic president. I think 1984 is the election that not only confirmed but expanded what happened in 1980, and proved that the election of Reagan in 1980 was not simply an anti-Carter vote, but that people were beginning to vote for a new set of national values and vote for something different than what had governed them for the past 40 or 50 years.

While 1984 has been much criticized and talked about as a campaign devoid of issues, I think that nothing could be further from the truth. I think 1984 was the most ideological, the most idea-oriented election that we have had in 40 or 50 years. We had two candidates who represented two fundamentally different ideas about how we ought to govern ourselves in this country. Both of them were consistent in those ideas, both of them had 20 or 25-year records as public officials in which they had articulated those same ideas. Neither one of them was seen as a fringe character like Barry Goldwa-

ter or George McGovern, who really was outside the electorate or not qualified to be president. So you had two candidates who represented fundamentally different ideas for the voters to choose from in this election. And while style and character and leadership were important in this election, fundamentally the voters knew what they were doing when they voted for one and not the other. They knew they were choosing one basic set of ideas about how we govern ourselves, as opposed to one that they had been voting for for 20 or 30 years. Frankly, as an aside, it bothers me a great deal to hear it said that the voters in some way were tricked by an actor or tricked in any election by slick commercials or slick candidates or slick campaigns. I think that simply demeans the voter. I've been doing polling for about 20 years now and it is my observation that in every top-of-the-ticket election I've ever been involved with, presidential, gubernatorial, or senatorial races, the voters have a very true and accurate view of just what they're voting for and what they are voting against. They may not love the person they are voting for, but they do consider him the better of the two choices. The voters are well aware of what it is they are doing at that time.

Now let's take a short look at just what happened in this election and the significance of the old coalition, and possibly a new one forming. If you look at it electorally, Reagan not only carried 49 states this time, but if you go back to 1980, there has emerged, because of the electoral-vote shift over a few years and changes in voting patterns, a situation where there are now more core Republican electoral votes, about 157, than there are core Democratic electoral votes, about 138. Even in 1980, Reagan carried about 50%, thanks in large part to Texas, of those core Democratic electoral votes and then, in 1984, carried them all but Minnesota for the second time. I think that out of this you see that at least four states, if viewed from 1952 on, have clearly changed from being basically Democratic states presidentially to being Republican states presidentially—North Carolina, Florida, Texas, and, probably, Alaska. And when you look at the various demographic groups that were key to that New Deal coalition and look at what Reagan did in those groups, not only in 1980 but again in 1984, you see that he really broke apart and fragmented beyond any rebuilding possibility those basic groups, the most important being southern whites. Depending on what state you're in or how you define the exact region of the South, Reagan got something around 80%, or a little above 80%, of all southern white votes in this campaign. Of union and blue-collar workers, the fundamental piece in the northern large industrial states of that coalition, Reagan got around 44% or 45% in 1980 and increased that by 3% to 5% in this election. He attracted something over 55% of the Catholics, I believe, in this election and, probably the most surprising of all, about 60% of the 18 to 24-year-old voters, the youngest voters in the electorate.

We have talked somewhat about coattails. If we look beyond the actual number of House seats, I think the more we learn about the returns from a week or ten days ago, we'll find that this was a somewhat broader party victory than was first interpreted. I believe the Republicans picked up, I'm not sure what the exact number is, about 15 House seats. That is as many House seats as any incumbent has picked up, with the exception of 1944, since 1900. And, more important, the Republicans get, depending on whether you include all seats or those contested seats, around 50%, plus a little, of all the popular vote cast for congressional candidates in the country. That has traditionally been used as a measure of party strength-the general

popular vote. Republican strength for twenty-five or thirty years has been 46% to 48%. In both '80 and '84, it is up to something around 50%. They gained about 350 legislative seats in the country and in a number of states—Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, in particular—picked up a large number of local elections. So once you get down below just the pure number of House of Representative seats, I think you see something closer to a party victory than may have been generally talked about in the first day or two after the election. And, again, just as further evidence, and not to talk about Peter Hart or the Democrats, is that the last time the Democratic presidential candidate carried the white vote in this country, which is 87% of the total, was in 1964, twenty years ago. The last time a northern, liberal Democratic presidential ticket carried the United States, if you include Truman as representing a border state in 1948, was in 1940. That coalition that emerged in the '30s and '40s, only to make the point, is really gone.

There are three theories, I think, that might emerge, or three possibilities in the 1988 election. The first theory is that you're going to continue to have a Republican conservative close to a Reagan coalition emerge, assuming that someone who is an extension of Reagan, to some degree, is nominated and elected in 1988. Second is the possibility that the Democrats may be able to redefine themselves as something other than the New Deal coalition. I think you saw a preview of that struggle with the (Gary) Hart candidacy this year. They may evolve and take advantage of the fact that there are still a few more adherents to the Democratic Party when we get away from this election than there are the Republican Party. The Democrats may be able to regenerate and redefine themselves as something other than New Deal and take advantage of that inherent identification advantage they have. And the third theory, the so-called de-alignment theory, is that we're not going to have any governing coalition for a long time; that we have simply fragmented the electorate into small coalition constituencies that will come together for one or two elections, then break apart and re-form. I personally don't think that will happen. There's no historical evidence for that happening in this country. I think we will emerge from this period in four, eight, maybe even 12 years with some kind of a governing coalition that will last for a period of time.

I'll close with just a few words on the Reagan campaign specifically. As I said earlier, and as Peter talked about, not very much happened in this campaign. So I don't think it's very instructive to discuss it on a kind of play-by-play basis. I do think that, going into it, the Reagan campaign was faced with two or three conditions. One, you had two candidates who really did represent two fundamentally different ideas, and the public knew that. Second, Reagan had a huge advantage in the personal quality of leadership over Mondale. Third, the Democratic talk in the primaries about registration and turnout and the Jesse Jackson drive for registration and turnout scared the Republicans into putting a whole lot of effort into registration and turnout themselves. Fourth, Reagan went in with a basic 10-to-12 point lead, and so the objectives of the campaign were relatively simple. It was simply an effort to control the agenda, to keep the campaign focused on those issues that we wanted and let Ronald Reagan be the issue, let this campaign be as much as anything a referendum on Ronald Reagan. We knew he had a lead and that people approved of him. The objective was to take advantage of the idea that people thought he had restored pride and confidence and let the campaign be a referendum on him. To do that, we wanted to keep the campaign focused on three major issues, not to debate specific issues of bills that were

in Congress, exact proposals that might be made next year, but simply to keep it focused on the economy, prosperity, peace, and increased respect for the United States in the world. We wanted to keep it focused on the issue of leadership and, particularly, on the idea that his leadership over the last four years had worked. That you thought it worked, and that the country and most families were better off than they were four years ago, was the best evidence that the kind of policies we ought to keep in place were those that had worked during the past four years. So, as you look at the specifics of the campaign—the scheduling, the advertising, and all those organizational efforts—they were simply all designed to try to focus the campaign and the nation on those two or three central and important issues.

The two points, I think, at which the campaign did close a little were the two that Peter Hart talked about. The first, right after the Democratic National Convention when the Reagan campaign and we got ourselves into a little flap over the tax, with Bush and with Reagan and others saying something different about whether taxes were going to be raised. And the second was that period of five or six days right after the first debate. But if you take those two out of it, I think you look at an electorate where Reagan went in with about an 11-or-12 point lead that was fairly solid and, depending at given points in time whether things were going well for Reagan or poorly for Mondale, that lead tended to get up to 17% or 18% or 20%, but would not go back down below about 11% or 12% As we look at the dynamics of the campaign, there were very few that were important. Reagan held a 55% to 56% total all the way through. Thank you. (Applause)

MOYERS: Bob, to what extent were you scared after the first debate when it appeared that the President was out to lunch? (Laughter)

TEETER: Moderately, I guess, is the right answer. I think there were two things. One, the President failed to do what he had always done very well in the past. That had been exactly his kind of a forum. He had debated a whole series of times in his political life and had always done very well. And so, that was being interpreted, by the press particularly, and by a lot of voters, as simply a change. It ended bringing up the age issue and looked like it could shift the campaign away from those central things I just mentioned we wanted to focus on and force us to debate a whole series of other issues, including his age, which we didn't want to talk about very badly. We wanted to stay oriented to the peace and prosperity and leadership issues. On the other hand, we had never seen debates, I believe, be that important in elections, particularly when one candidate has had a lead. If you go back and look at the exit polls that night, only about 8% of the voters said that the debates were important to them in making up their minds. The most important thing to do after that debate was simply cut it off. And it was at that point we were very fortunate to have the Bush-Ferraro debate come in four or five days later. What it did was end that first debate story and let us go on and focus on the second debate.

MOYERS: You said, and I tend to agree with you in essence, that this presidential race was a strongly ideological choice. If that's so, how do you explain the fact that the Senate and House races didn't happen to change the ideological makeup of Congress and may even, in the Senate, in fact have moved it slightly more moderate or liberal?

TEETER: I think you have to separate those two. First of all is the evidence in Senate races. If you look at the eight or nine times in the last 80 years that presidents have run for re-election, there has been very little change, at the most a plus

three or minus two, very little change in Senate seats. Those have become very much local events. They are the top of the ticket in their states. There's a lot of money spent on them. Voters are very aware of them and they don't tend to be particularly related to the presidential election.

House races, on the other hand, have tended to be much more related to the presidential election and the House vote much more reflective of it. I said that Republicans got something in contested seats just over 50% of the total House vote in those elections and that they did not pick up as many seats as that would indicate. I believe there are two reasons for that. I simply think we are in an era now, because of the way we redistrict ourselves and because incumbents have an advantage where 94-95 percent of all incumbents who run are re-elected, that we're not going to see those 40-50 seat swings that we traditionally have. I think that the range we're going to see now is 15, 20, 25 seats at an absolute maximum. That's just shrunk itself down now that we will not get those great changes.

MOYERS: But doesn't this mean that the country is, in fact, not at such an ideological divide as seems to be evident in the presidential race? I do not believe that people are going to the polls and saying I'm going to vote for Ronald Reagan for president, but I want a Democratic House to check him. I think that they go, as you said, to vote for local issues and not ideological issues or even power issues.

TEETER: I think that in Senate and House elections I agree with you. People go and vote for president because of the candidate they want to vote for, then go to the House race and vote for the candidate they want to vote for. What's happened in the House races is that we have given a tremendous advantage to incumbents. I think that is what is reflected in the last 12 or 14 years, just a tremendous advantage of the incumbent. We don't get that kind of turnover and we simply compound that with the way we draw the district lines now. There simply are not very many swing seats anymore.

MOYERS: You raised the question of realignment in the South in particular. You referred to several returns there. I remember being surprised to find President Johnson in a melancholy state of mind shortly after he signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was, of course, the big breakthrough in that era. When I asked him why, he said, "I think I just delivered the South to the Republican party for perhaps the next 30 years. It was worth it," he said, "but I think, in fact, I'm glad I won't be running from the South again for a long time to come." And the conversation revealed his concern that he would in fact create a white backlash which George Wallace, in fact, exploited in '68, Nixon turned to his advantage in '72, Jimmy Carter blocked temporarily by being a white, southern male, but which Ronald Reagan in both elections has captured. And I saw the statistics the other day which show that white, southern, protestant males voted for Ronald Reagan to the same extent that black southerners voted for Mondale. What does that say to you about the South and the effectiveness of a GOP strategy which seems to many people to have played on the old racial tensions in the South?

TEETER: I think that you can't deny that race is still a very important factor in southern voting. If you go back and look now at the Goldwater and Johnson election in 1964, the historical fact is that the Republicans gave up 20% or 25% of the black vote in the country. Historically, before that, many Republicans got 30 to 35%. It went down to 10%. But it opened up the South. And since 1964, the South has always voted for who they perceived to be the most conservative of the candidates. They voted for Wallace in '68, Nixon in '72, Carter,

who they viewed as more conservative, in '76, and Reagan in '80 and '84. Race is still a major factor in southern elections. But it is not the only one. Clearly, the South is more conservative economically, and, clearly, the South is more defense-oriented than the rest of the country. I think all of those things came into play in the Republican gains in the South and that it is not purely a race or backlash issue.

MOYERS: You mentioned the young vote. Why did the young vote go so largely for Ronald Reagan?

TEETER: We found two or three reasons. There's the much-talked-about reason that he simply was a more appealing and popular figure and that many young voters had only known two or three national political figures in their lifetimes—Carter, Reagan, and Mondale—and that Reagan was far and away the most popular of those. The events that had cost the Republicans so much, going back to Vietnam for instance, had no effect on them. Many of those voters were seven or eight or nine years old when Vietnam was at its height, and were eight or nine years old when Watergate was at its height. Second, the thing that was most important to those voters was Reagan's sense of optimism and hope of economic growth and opportunity for the future. Remember that the voters who are 18 to 24 years old now are those who are coming through the population right behind the baby boom. They know that money for education and money for many other things is going to be sucked out, even as they get to the retirement age, by those in the baby boom generation. It leads to the whole idea of limited growth. The population bulge right in front of them is going to take away many of the opportunities, including jobs, that would otherwise be available to them. I think that the most important of Reagan's appeals to them was the whole notion of opportunity and growth.

The third item which we found in many of our advertising tests among the working class, from the lower educated of those young voters, was that the idea of having restored respect for the United States around the world and an increased national defense strength was very important to them. Time and again, I sat through small groups of young voters being interviewed after having looked at Reagan ads and had them talk about the idea that he increased respect for the United States around the world. I think that the carry-over of the Iranian hostage event which was going on just at the time they were in high school, or just out of high school, was important. That was a third element, not as important as the first two, but that surprised me.

MOYERS: To what extent do you think they were affected by remembrances of inflation, that they remember their families sitting around the table talking about high tuition and high cost of living in the last few years of the Carter administration, and that young people want price stability, they want a sense of economic stability now?

TEETER: I think that was important, but I don't think it was important to the degree that it was specifically inflation. I don't think they were as affected by inflation when they were at those young ages. I think that what communicates is the whole sense of good times versus bad times, almost a psychological mood that was driven by economic conditions.

MOYERS: Last question to you, and then I'd like for Peter Hart to ask you, as in the debate, the question he would most like to make you squirm about concerning the Republican strategy, and then you shall have the chance to ask him a question to make him squirm. But wouldn't all this talk about a political realignment disappear if there were to be a recession before the off-year

elections of 1986?

TEETER: No, I don't think so. It might disappear temporarily. But when you go back and look at most realignments, a little less in the Roosevelt one than others, you are going to find ups and downs. Let's assume for a minute that you are going to get some kind of Republican realignment over the next 10 or 15 years. They're going to lose some elections during that period of time. They lost an election in 1982 and they could lose in 1986 and still have realignment. And so you're going to have ups and downs. The fact is that the Democrats, while they had that governing coalition for 45 or 50 years, lost some elections during that time. So I think if you look at it with a long view, it's not necessarily true.

MOYERS: Peter, fire away.

HART: I'd only ask one question, and not for the purpose of making Bob squirm. We tried to do that during the election period, not after. Basically, what do you think is the biggest threat or fear, the biggest uncertainty about this emerging Republican coalition? What is it that you fear most could keep it from happening?

TEETER: That it ends up with some kind of a division over the religious right issues, because I think that as long as it stays focused primarily on the two major issues where most of the voters want to see it focused—on the economy and how you maintain economic growth without inflation, and on foreign policy and how you maintain peace and move toward arms control and lessen international tensions, it's in very good shape. I think that once it begins to get divided over all those Religious Right issues, then that really threatens to pull it apart.

HART: Are there others, as you notice the fault lines within the Democratic Party, that go beyond the New Right social agenda?

TEETER: Well, I don't think that there are any serious ones because we're not talking about a coalition that's really emerged yet. The Republicans still are just coming into that period, and I'm not sure they ought not still be characterized as a minority party. One characteristic of all minorities is that they tend to become a little more united, homogeneous.

HART: Let's hope that it doesn't work. (Laughter)

MOYERS: Would you be a little more explicit in your answer about the threat? Are you saying that young people who tend to be more or less libertarian when they are told how to live their lives, their social private lives, are potentially at odds with the Religious Right that really wants to try to make certain things definite about how private lives should be led? Is that the conflict you see?

TEETER: I think that is one of the conflicts, and I think it's indicative of a broader conflict, which is simply that the Republican coalition as it now exists is pretty united on economic issues. It is pretty united on foreign policy issues. But there is great disagreement within it on a whole variety of social issues.

MOYERS: So we'll have several conflicts in the next few years, Democrats versus Republicans traditionally, Democrats versus Democrats, the social welfare Democrats versus the new wave Democrats, and then, in the Republican party, the social authoritarians versus....

TEETER: I mean that's why '88 at this point looks so fascinating. You're going to have three major battles. You're going to have a battle for the soul of the Republican party, a battle for the soul of the Democratic party, and ultimately a battle for the soul of the country in the general election.

MOYERS: All right, you may now ask a question of Peter.

TEETER: I only have one that I want to ask. When Walter Mondale at the Democratic

Convention decided to mention the fact that he thought we needed to have a tax increase....

HART: I've heard this question before. (Laughter)

TEFTER: How much of a risk did he think or did you in the campaign think there was at the time? Did you think it was as great a risk as it turned out to be when you actually did it?

HART: I have to tell you, and it isn't a way of saying, "Don't look at me," but the fact of the matter is, I saw the speech approximately 24 hours ahead of time, at least that relevant portion, and we had enough public opinion data to know that raising taxes was not a popular issue in America. (Laughter) It did not take a lot of insight there. When he raised that issue, we knew there was going to be a potential fire storm. But go back to one other point. One of the three things we tried to achieve during the campaign was to improve the public perception of Walter Mondale as a leader. And there were five qualities of leadership that are involved in the American perception. The most important in 1984 was what we call the mythic quality of leadership, and that had to do with charisma, and it had to do with strength. The theory was that, by being bold and specific, Walter Mondale could move up the ladder on the mythic quality. So, while giving up something on the issue front, clearly we thought we could move up on the leadership front. Coming back around, the only way it would have worked is if we had buttressed the overall opinion on taxes. I think then it would have shifted back to a question of Ronald Reagan because, indeed, that's where we wanted the referendum to be also.

MOYERS: You just mentioned the term "the mythic quality." I'd like to hear both of you define that term and explain how it works in American politics. Are you saying that the image is now more important than the truth, or has the image become the truth? What is the mythic quality?

HART: Well, the mythic quality relates very much to image and perception, and within that it is boldness, strength, and toughness. There are five components to leadership, and depending upon the candidates and the character, different components become most important. And what was interesting about 1984 is that the mythic quality was up there, and what we would call the stability factor was at the bottom. What happened during the period of the first debate is that the stability factor started to rise and that is one which asks "How big a risk, how much uncertainty should I have?" And until the Reagan age factor and the question of whether he was really in charge came up, the election, as Bob said, was going along on a very smooth track, certainly on leadership. And what we were trying to do in the Mondale campaign was to establish Walter Mondale's credentials on the mythic quality while at the same time looking to reshuffle the order of priorities. But the mythic quality relates to the sense of strength and sense of charisma.

MOYERS: It was what led Congress a few years ago to give its very rare gold medal to John Wayne as an American hero. Interesting. (Laughter)

This gets us near to the closing question. We're going to begin our break at 10:30 and come back and have our panel discussion, and then you will be able to ask questions of all of these participants, and we will be out of here at least by halftime of the game this afternoon. We will stay on schedule, and we will hold up a card behind the panel to announce the scores. (Laughter) I must tell you that, given this election, it seems to me that the Christians have a real edge. (Laughter) Secular humanism is in for it at The University of Texas. (Laughter)

I would like to ask a question of you two. I have taken some comfort this

year in the fact that you are about to replace us as the real goats of the American political system. (Laughter) Or at least we'll be in the same corral. I have heard more negative comments. Just yesterday morning when I checked out of one hotel to move to another, the concierge said to me, "I am going to come tomorrow because I want to ask those people to leave us alone, stop meddling in our opinions and telling us what we think before we vote." And I noticed that in the latter days of the Mondale campaign, when he would mention the polls, the people would boo, obviously because they were so far behind. But there is a growing perception, at least as this journalist perceives it, of hostility to so much polling on your part and so much delivering of it on our part. And I wonder what you two think about this? Does it worry you?

HART: Bob! Talk about the kids. (Laughter)

TEETER: Certainly. I think there is some reason for concern because of so many polls and the great range and quality of the polls. At the same time, I think that possibly many of us who comment and talk about this think that the voters pay more attention to the polls than they do. It seems to me polls are simply information about the electorate. When a newspaper takes a poll and publishes it about the electorate, it is in many ways doing the same kind of reporting it has always done with its political reporters. Political reporters used to go out and talk to 15 or 20 people and write a story and say, "Here's what the voters are thinking," or "Here's what's going to happen in this election." If a newspaper takes a poll and publishes it, it is choosing, rather than 20 people, perhaps 500 or 1,000 people, and choosing more carefully and maybe doing a more accurate job of reporting that information. To argue that this information ought not to be published, or ought not to be collected or made available, makes an argument I am not comfortable with because it implies that less information is better. And I think a basic premise of published polls, and for polling that is done for candidates and party organizations, is that it is simply providing more information. We have always operated on the assumption—at least the press has—that the more information the voters have, the better.

MOYERS: I noticed that during the second debate, your campaign gathered forty representative people in a room in Kansas City and had them respond to a button, registering their emotions as they watched the debate, and I'm wondering why you did that and what you did with the information? Did you then go out and craft speeches for Mr. Reagan so that he could respond to what the voters wanted him to believe?

TEETER: No, that little exercise was kind of an experimental thing. We have used that a variety of times.

MOYERS: I've heard that before.

TEETER: Similar to that exercise is a technique available where you can have people watch a 30-minute speech or 30-minute program, or something longer than a television spot, and simply find out that way what lines in the spot are particularly effective, or what things people agree or disagree with. I think the first time I ever saw that technique used well was in the 1976 primary campaign when I was then working for Gerald Ford against Ronald Reagan. About the time we thought we had Reagan laid away, he beat our socks off in North Carolina and came back to make a real race out of it. He did that, in a large part, on the basis of a 30-minute speech on television that he used not only in North Carolina, but in a whole variety of areas. We showed that speech to a large number of people—and at that time that type of equipment

was very experimental—and asked them to respond as to what parts they agreed or disagreed with. What it told us is the kind of arguments and what lines in that Reagan 30-minute program were very effective and what people really agreed with.

I think that the sophistication with which pollsters and advertising agencies and campaign managers are reputed to work is vastly overstated. I have seen more decisions made, frankly, going across Washington in the back of a cab in a campaign than I have by analyzing complex and sophisticated polling data and testing commercials.

MOYERS: I assume that the Democrats do this, too. I know that you did some of your research by peering through a one-way window or mirror at voters who were doing whatever they were doing. Sounds almost like pornographic politics. (Laughter) What were you doing behind that one-way window? And what were they doing? (Laughter)

TEETER: They were watching ads. That is a very conventional way used in all advertising agencies to pretest television ads. Virtually all major advertising that goes on in the United States is tested in what are called focus group interviews, where you get a variety of people in a room, a certain select audience, ask them to look at the commercial, fill out a questionnaire, and then have a discussion with them. Often, people are told that there are other people listening, and they see the microphones. There's nothing secretive about it.

HART: I just want to add to that. Having worked for *The Wall Street Journal* since 1976, and more recently in the '84 election, I can report that we used a lot of focus group interviews, and the reason you have a one-way mirror is that you have a half dozen people sitting around a room. To have other individuals in the group creates a false atmosphere, and that's what you're trying to avoid. But let me go to the broader question, and I think it's an important question. I think to a certain extent, pollsters are becoming antiheroes and, in part, what the American people are saying is "give us back our elections." There is a sense that we may do our business well, but there is also a sense that, somehow, we're intruding too far into the process. That may or may not be the case, but the broader question is in terms of public opinion. If you take the two seminal events over the last 20 years, Watergate and Vietnam, you found the public was really far ahead of the politicians in both instances. If we hadn't had the public opinion polls and a way of measuring that, I don't think we would have gotten out of Vietnam when we did. The other question goes to the Watergate event. I don't think that Richard Nixon would have necessarily had to resign if we hadn't had public opinion pushing the politicians to their natural conclusion. I think that's a point to consider.

MOYERS: It is a point to consider, but it does seem to me—and we should address this in some other forum—that the union of sophisticated polling, mass media, and money has permanently changed the shape of American politics.

You two have done an admirable job this morning. All of us, I think, have learned considerably from your insights and I look forward to having you join in the discussion later with the other goats from the media who will be here for the second half of the session. Thank you.

BILL MOYERS: A few weeks ago I went to Middlebury College, where my youngest son is a student, for a week-long conference on Christianity and Buddhism. The Dalai Lama and a number of other people were there, including William Buckley, to discuss the question of the relationship between Christianity and Buddhism. And my good friend and native Texan, Olin Robinson, who's the president of Middlebury College, told the story that in preparation for the coming of the Dalai Lama and his very large entourage which travels with him, one of the officials of Middlebury called the car rental agency in Burlington, an hour away, to make reservations for a van to pick up the Dalai Lama and his entourage and bring them to Middlebury. And when the college official got the clerk on the line at Avis and said, "I'd like to make a reservation for the Dalai Lama and his entourage," there was a long silence, followed by the woman saying, "We always have trouble when we rent our vehicles to those rock groups." (Laughter) Well, you have up here this morning a rock group. If you read the names, you'll see it's a rather jazzy group, but if you look at their experience you'll discover it's a very credible group. And we're going to try to have a lively conversation among them before turning to questions from you.

Looking at this group reminds me of the woman who went to get a divorce. When the lawyer took out his yellow pad to find out the purpose of the divorce, he said to her, "Well, do you have grounds?" And she said, "Yes, we have grounds. We have about two acres." And he said, "No, no, I mean do you have a grudge?" She said, "No, we don't have a grudge, but we have a lovely carport." He was getting exasperated, and he said, "Does he beat you up?" And she said, "No, I get up half an hour before him every day." And he said, "Lady, why do you want a divorce?" And she said, "Because you just can't carry on an intelligent conversation with that fellow." (Laughter) Well, I think we'll be able to carry on an intelligent conversation with this group.

You'll see their names as I introduce them briefly. I have exercised the prerogative of the growing authoritarian spirit in America, by asking them to limit their opening remarks to exactly what I have on the evening news, which is a minute and 45, sometimes 45½ seconds. I have asked them to answer the question, "If you had only one thing to say about the 1984 election, in two minutes, what would you say?" After that, there will be some questions of them and they'll ask each other some questions, and then we'll take questions from you in the audience.

Jeff Alderman is director of the polling unit at ABC News. Prior to that, he was with the Associated Press for several years. He supervised the development in 1976 of AP's data bank, which is a computerized political campaign library of voting and polling information tracking the candidates' stands on issues. He was also responsible at AP for investigative reports on social and political issues. He had been energy editor for the Associated Press. Before that, he had served as eastern manager for the News and Election Service and he began, like so many of us, as a reporter for his hometown newspaper, the *Holyoke Transcript Telegram* in Massachusetts.

Fred Barnes is the national political reporter for *The Sun* in Baltimore. He's a graduate of the University of Virginia, was a reporter with *The News and Courier* in Charleston, South Carolina, then went to *The Washington Star* for 12 years where he covered local news, the White House and the Supreme Court. He joined, in 1979, *The Sun* in Baltimore where he is today. He's been a Nieman Fellow at Harvard and has written for various journals. He was, as

you know, the man on the October 7 Presidential Debate who violated the Constitution by asking the candidates a religious test for their eligibility. We'll have some lawyers here this morning who intend to take him to task.

Adam Clymer is polling editor of *The New York Times*. He assumed that position in 1983. Before that, he covered national politics for the Washington Bureau of the *Times* after serving with the *New York Daily News* where he had been since December 1976, and before that, 13 years on *The Sun* in Baltimore. On *The Sun* he was foreign correspondent in Moscow and New Delhi. He also covered the Supreme Court, Congress, the State Department, the White House, and national politics. He had some experience in politics during the 1958 campaign of Averell Harriman, and then in 1959, he studied at the University of Capetown in South Africa on a Frank Knox Fellowship. He, too, began at the local level with the Norfolk, Virginia, *Pilot* and has been the recipient of several awards.

John Mashek is someone many of you in Texas know because he was in Austin during the Johnson years. He began his career with *U.S. News and World Report* when he opened the magazine's southwest bureau in Houston in July of 1965. From that base in Houston, he covered everything from LBJ at the Texas White House to the beginnings of the rapidly expanding space flight program. Then he moved to Washington to lead the magazine's Congressional coverage in 1970. He served as chief White House correspondent from the time that Gerald Ford took the Presidency in August of 1974 until early in the Carter administration when he was named political editor in January of 1978, and national correspondent in 1984. He's covered every presidential campaign in my adult lifetime from Barry Goldwater to Lyndon Johnson, to Gerald Ford. He's been on several national panels, and you saw him this fall as a panelist in the Ferraro-Bush debate. We're glad to have him back. He's really at heart a Texan.

Let's start, John, with you, and the others will be forced to revise their carefully planned remarks as we go down the line.

MASHEK: Bill, I don't think anybody on the panel can clear his throat in a minute and 45 seconds, or even cover one point, but here goes.

First, I think that the youth vote was one of the most stunning developments this year, and I suggest that it's still up for grabs and is apt to be very fickle. I was struck by a quote in *The Washington Post*, the day after the election, out of Raleigh, North Carolina, where a Reagan celebrant of 18 said, "If I wear a Rolex at 18, think of what I'll be wearing at 30." (Laughter) Well, that tells me that there could be some smugness there, that if he's got a Timex on and there is a recession, the Democrats may be back in the ball game very quickly for that vote.

On the much discussed subject of realignment, I differ slightly with Bob Teeter, although I certainly believe that the last two Reagan victories have opened up a path for the Republicans that can't be denied. Because all of us who write on politics like to think about the future, I was amazed last weekend with a group of people, predominantly Republicans, who were almost despondent, and just four or five days after winning a landslide election. Why? Well, they're worried about the President showing any leadership on the deficit, and they are already talking about losing the Senate in 1986 when there will be 22 Republicans out of the 34 senators who will be putting their necks on the line. There's no doubt that the in-fighting has already started for the post-Reagan era leadership within the party. And the Religious Right is very much a part of that. And I think that Bob's (Teeter) right. If the

Mashek

Republicans can keep that group from taking over the agenda, realignment might be possible. But they are zealous, and you're going to see them all over the landscape in the next few years.

This is not to minimize at all the tremendous job the Democrats are going to have. They have to put a national party back together and show that they are not a party of disparate special interest groups, be it Walter Mondale or whoever, because it seems that in national elections everything just falls apart for the Democrats.

A distinguished member of the audience, Liz Carpenter, asked me to take a poll here since we are talking so much about polls. How many in this room voted for Ronald Reagan? How many voted for Walter Mondale? Fritz, you've got to get down here. You could have had the election in this room. (Laughter) I should add a third category. How many don't want to tell me how they voted?

I want to say something about the accuracy of the polls because I'm something of a "doubting Thomas" myself. I agree with Bill (Moyers) when he referred to the dreary nature of this race. It was one-sided. People kept reading repetitious things. I think that was why they got sick and tired of the polls. But on the afternoon of the election, at 3 o'clock at ABC, the first cut came in from just a smattering of states and the result at that time was Reagan 60%-Mondale 40% and it stayed that way all night in literally every category, every age group, every income group. I thought it was a fantastic



Alderman

thing. The accuracy is just unbelievable. Thank you.

MOYERS: Jeffrey Alderman, director of polling for ABC News.

ALDERMAN: Thanks, John (Mashek). Let me tell you about my day in the same time frame you were talking about, about 5 o'clock, a couple of hours later. I went to a briefing for the anchors to tell them what the exit polls were showing. I saw what amounted to a different election than the one we actually got. Naturally, I saw the 49 state sweep by the President, but I also saw the possibility of higher-than-expected gains in the House, over 30 seats. And looking at the Senate races, a lot of them were close. I could see that maybe the Democrats weren't going to get that one or two that all thought they were going to get. Maybe even the Republicans were going to get a gain in the Senate. I saw in the numbers the bottom dropping out for the Democratic Party. Well, it didn't happen. The 49 state sweep did happen. But the gains in the House were 15, maybe now 16 after some recounts. There was a net gain of two Democrats in the Senate. It's almost as though there were two elections out there, one for the record books and one for the election summaries the next day that said, "Well, a great personal triumph for Reagan, 49 states."

But the mandate is limited because the Democrats will still control the House. There were Democratic gains in the Senate. I even heard some commentator saying that the election was a mixed message. And, of course, we've heard a great deal today about whether we've had the start of realign-

ment. When you look beyond the records of who got elected and who didn't, I think you see a rather dramatic change going on, and I'm just going to cite a couple of things that jumped out at me as I started looking over the numbers.

Here, in Texas, more people said that they were Republicans than said they were Democrats. In the state of Mississippi, a majority of those people who said they were Democrats were also black. The vote nationwide indicates to me that most people in this country thought they were voting for a Republican majority in the Congress. It seems that we haven't got all the votes counted for Congress yet, but it seems to me that we're going to have the highest vote for Republican candidates in the House that we've had since '52 in Eisenhower's election. So something's happened. The question is, will it keep going? Will it keep rolling? Is it a rolling realignment as someone described it? Or is this rather shallow, on thin ice?

I'm not sure, but I do know one thing: The one thing that best predicted whether someone was going to vote for Reagan or Mondale was their view of whether they were better off financially. Just one example of that: We asked people, "Are you any of the following?" One of the categories was environmentalist. Environmentalists went strongly for Walter Mondale, until we teased out those who felt they were better off financially, and then they went for Ronald Reagan. In any group, nuclear-freeze advocates, the same thing. Even among black voters, about 40% of those blacks who felt they were better off financially voted for Reagan. So if the economy turns into recession, it goes down the tubes with all the other issues going against Reagan. I'm not so sure that this can be kept going. And we're facing in about two years, history tells us, a recession. Right about the year it's time for another election. So, this may be a short-lived phenomenon, or a long-lived one, and I'm not really prepared to say which it is right now.

MOYERS: Thank you very much, Jeff. Adam Clymer, assistant to the executive editor of *The New York Times*, and who runs their polls.

CLYMER: We've spent this morning trying to tease out, as the pollsters say, the meaning of what, at least on the face of it, looks at the moment like President Reagan's lonely landslide. We're trying to see whether it's likely to go further, whether, indeed, the Republicans will become the dominant political party in the country in more than presidential elections. They seem to be that already. For me, there's a lot of evidence to suggest they've got an awfully good chance at it. This was an election, as Bob Teeter has mentioned, where there was a great expectation of the importance of new voters. Well, by our numbers, 8% of the people who voted this time registered for the first time in 1984, and 60% of them voted for Ronald Reagan. We found evidence that new voters and younger voters voted not only for Reagan, and in much greater numbers than their counterparts did four years ago, but called themselves Republicans to a greater degree than their predecessors. They voted for Republican House candidates to a greater degree than their predecessors. But we don't know where all of this is going to lead.

I'd like to tread on Bill Moyers' advice and take up two subjects in my brief moment here. The point is simply that much of what we have been discussing this morning, and not just from Bob Teeter and Peter Hart, but from John Mashek and Bill Moyers, have been points that develop out of the polls. The support that young voters gave the President is something that might have been apparent anecdotally to reporters if they had talked to a great many of them, but no one would have been nearly as sure without the polls. The tremendous white, Protestant support in the South, we'd have been reason-

Clymer

ably sure of without polls, but we know it with polls. I think that if we try to understand what's happening to our political system, the poll bashing that goes on from time to time is fundamentally destructive. I think that it's important in a democracy for the leaders, the people for whom Bob Teeter and Peter Hart work, to know what people think. Now they may sometimes put that information to bad use. There may even be a politician somewhere in this land who says something he doesn't believe because his pollster tells him it will help him. (Laughter) You probably wouldn't be experienced with that here, but somewhere in the East. (Laughter) But a great many politicians do want to know what the public thinks and do want to know how best to present an argument in which they believe in order to persuade the public to buy it. The politicians are going to have those polls. And then I think it's important for the rest of us to know what they know and to have some sense of why it is they are making these decisions. So I think that the tendency to poll bash is fundamentally destructive.

I even discern it sometimes from some of the consumers, television people or newspaper writers, who complain. My good friend, David Broder of *The Washington Post*, is one of the leading critics of network use of exit polls and yet the *Post* went to press on a lead, that he probably wrote about 8 o'clock at night, that proclaimed Ronald Reagan the winnner of the election, and there's no way that anybody had enough real returns at that hour to know that. (Applause)

MOYERS: Good, we'll come back to that. Fred Barnes, national political reporter in the Washington Bureau of *The Sun* in Baltimore.

Barnes

BARNES: The one conclusion that I've drawn about the campaign that's being reinforced here today, particularly by what Peter Hart and Bob Teeter said, is that the press really didn't do a very good job in covering the presidential campaign. As Bob Teeter said, "Nothing happened." And yet I was writing stories nearly every day. Some of them breathless. (Laughter) So we were at least acting as if a great deal was going on. I agree with the point that very little happened. If you saw the polls a year ago, they resembled pretty much what occurred on November 6. But there were a lot of other areas, and I'm going to touch on five or six very briefly, where the press was wrong in what it said or how it characterized something.

Certainly, the press did not characterize the campaign, as both Peter and Bob have, as a campaign of ideas. And I happen to think that ideas are very important in politics. Perhaps the ideas are such long-term ones, and change occurs over a long period of time, that reporters don't notice them. It's not something that changed from last week. And there was one overriding idea that struck me as a changed one in this campaign, and that is the idea of what is the agent of progress in this country. I think most people about 20 years ago thought the answer to that was government, and now they think it's the private sector or business or something other than government. That's an important ideological change, and the press barely touched on that at all.

We also wrote about a personality contest, but I think we wrote about the

wrong one. There certainly was a personality contest at the presidential level, and I agree with both pollsters that it was not the most important thing, although if you just voted on that, Reagan would have won also. But there was an important personality contest at the level of House races. Members of Congress can run on purely local issues, on what they've done for their constituents. I happen to live in the 10th District of Virginia, which is in northern Virginia where the guy ran purely on what he had done for highways and in shutting down noise at National Airport. Those were not big national issues, but he was re-elected handily. He was a Republican. In many of those races, those were personality contests, and the genius of the Democrats in staving off a landslide in House races was in making those races on local issues and on the personality of the incumbent and what he had done for individuals.

A third idea that the press played up and was wrong about is that of the volatility of the electorate. A lot was written and said about that and it turned out that the electorate wasn't very volatile. The distinction was not made often enough between the electorate in the primary campaign and in a general election. In primaries, voters are volatile. Millions of voters in the North voted for George Wallace in Democratic primaries in '68 and '72 when I don't think they were really ready to vote for him in a general election for president. But in the general election, the voters were not volatile, despite what we might have written.

Another idea I think is wrong, and it's been conveyed over the years, is that the public is manipulated by pollsters and by money and by strategists, and so on. I really don't think there is much of that because in every race both campaigns have them. One campaign has Bob Teeter, the other campaign has Peter Hart. They tend to nullify each other. (Laughter) The real differences are conditions under which the election is being held—prosperity or recession, and the real distinctions between the candidates—the quality of the candidates.

And finally, an idea that the press fostered this year and that I think is untrue, although I was personally involved, is that the debates were all-important. I read a story in *The Sun*, of all places, not by me, a couple of weeks ago that said here was an election where, with all the campaigning, the primaries, everything, the only thing that mattered were the the two 90-minute programs when the candidates faced each other. That decided the election right there. I really don't think it did. I think that, like pollsters, the debates in this election tended to cancel each other out. And I found, particularly in my case, some solace in the meaninglessness of the debates because I really didn't want to be remembered as the guy who asked Ronald Reagan why he didn't go to church. And I discovered that people just don't remember me at all. (Laughter and applause)

MOYERS: Well, let's begin with Fred (Barnes). To what extent do you think, either anecdotally or from your analysis of the polls, that the Religious Right was a significant factor in this campaign?

BARNES: Well, I think the Religious Right was a significant factor with two groups. One, clearly the Republicans had a chance to win a majority of the Jewish vote for the first time ever, and they didn't get it because of the Falwell—Christian Right support of Reagan. The idea of a Christian America clearly turned them off. Democrats used that issue very well among Jewish voters. But I think among the other voters....

MOYERS: What was the Jewish vote finally?

BARNES: It wound up about 35%. Is that....

HART: 66% for Mondale, 32% for Reagan.

MOYERS: Certainly, the Republicans thought they had a chance of winning a majority of the Jewish vote.

CLYMER: They've been busy calling us up and telling us that our polls were no good ever since.

BARNES: I've gotten those calls from Richard Fox, too. But I think that the religious issue worked in Ronald Reagan's favor among some people, particularly among people who are "born again Christians" or evangelical Christians or strong Christians in one way or another, because I think many people did not interpret it as a question of church and state but as a question of whether you are for religion or against religion. And Ronald Reagan came out as being for religion and Walter Mondale against religion. That's not really what he was saying, but I think that's the way the issue was conveyed to voters. It also happened on the abortion issue. Joe Crangle, the Democratic boss in Buffalo, New York, complained at one point that it appeared that the Democratic party was an anti-Catholic party because they were fighting with the bishops over the subject of abortion.

MOYERS: Anybody else on the religious question?

ALDERMAN: There are about 17% of the voting population who said that they were "born again Christians" and they were very, very strong for Reagan. But among those people who felt candidates should not mix politics and religion, Mondale did very, very well.

MOYERS: Anybody else?

HART: I'll just put in a couple of statistics. We were obviously tracking this among white, fundamentalist protestants and nonfundamentalist protestants. In June, before the issue had been raised among white, fundamentalist protestants, there was a lead of 61 to 30 for the President. Among the nonfundamentalist, it was 64 to 27. So there was a huge gap to begin with. But a poll taken right after the Republican convention when this was heightened, the support for Reagan among the white, fundamentalist protestants shot up to 71-22, a full 10 points, while among the nonfundamentalists it was actually down two points. So, it was a calculated decision, and you would have to look at that and say, yes it worked.

MOYERS: Do any of you feel that the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism in politics has been synonymous exclusively with Reagan in '80 and '84 and will fade in the future, or is it one that is going to be around in increasingly influential ways in the future?

CLYMER: Bill, I'm not sure. They talked very much in 1981 about the influence they were going to have in 1982. And they had absolutely none. Indeed, the Moral Majority state directors were in Bermuda having a conference the weekend before the 1982 election. I'm not sure whether those organizational forces can be harnessed to anything other than a presidential election. They may be, but they haven't shown it yet.

TEETER: Where they do have the greatest impact has been in primaries and will probably continue to be in primaries. Most groups like that, whether it's unions or any kind of special interest group, tend to have disproportionate influence in a primary situation more than they do in the general election.

BARNES: Bill, if you look at the issue as just the Christian Right, basically the Jerry Falwell issue, I think you're looking at it a little narrowly. Anyone who has covered a black campaign, I don't mean Jesse Jackson in particular, but any black campaign, particularly in the South, you see the religious influence on

those campaigns. A choir from a church is usually there and there is a lot of religious talk, talk about being Christian. You see religion coming into politics, and perhaps it has always been there with the Catholic Church. The Catholic bishops have now stated their strong views on what the gospels say about domestic policy in the United States. That's clearly religious intrusion into domestic politics.

MOYERS: Now, I can assure you that Lyndon Johnson did not have Billy Graham skinny dip in the White House pool because he wanted to learn the intricacies of the Baptist doctrine of immersion. (Laughter) He was quite eager in 1964 to keep those white, southern males aboard. And if you have been out with Jesse Jackson, you know how enthusiastic his audiences were. I was intrigued, Fred, that you asked the question of religion to both candidates in the debate and then the President was asked why he did not go to church. And he said that it would be a threat to the people who were there. But that fear diminished as he got closer to the Jewish synagogue on Long Island where he attended. (Laughter) Some of you have been around for a while. Isn't this new religious enthusiasm unlike what people said about Martin Luther King in the '60s and the ministers who came to help pass the '64, '65, and '66 legislation? Isn't there a much more narrow sectarian appeal than the ecumenical appeal that was evoked and invoked by Martin Luther King?

MASHEK: Well, I think that's true to some extent, Bill, but Fred just pointed out that the Catholic bishops came out with their pastoral letter, and that certainly wasn't any narrow view. As a matter of fact, I heard some Mondale supporters say, "Where were the bishops when we needed them a couple of weeks before the election?" So I just don't think that it's just one very narrow lane here at all.

MOYERS: Adam, what happened to the nonvoter? What was the percentage of voter turnout in 1984 as compared to 1980?

CLYMER: The best numbers on turn-out look as if it's about 53.2%-53.3% of the voting-age population, which is up from 52.6% in 1980. That's not up much, but in every presidential election after John Kennedy's, that percentage has declined. So it has bottomed out or started to turn up. The best evidence that we see is that the nonvoters were about as much for Reagan as the voters were, and that this isn't one of those elections where the factor of turnout made a decisive difference. I looked at some pre-election numbers, the opinions of registered voters. On that calculation, it seemed to me that if the Mondale campaign got everyone to the polls who was not registered and everyone who said that they didn't intend to vote but who preferred Mondale, and if they all voted the way they said they were going to vote, and if the Reagan people got none of their supporters in this group to the polls, Reagan still would have won, and by about 10 points.

MOYERS: Do we know any more than we did four years ago about why people do not vote?

CLYMER: No. I think we know the same things, Bill. To a lot of them, it doesn't seem to matter. A lot of them say that state registration laws are the problem. State registration laws, indeed, are a great deal easier to cope with than they were 20 years ago, but there is still a certain amount of bureaucracy and obstacle. I come now from New York City where, in an effort to increase voter turnout, they appear to have hired the former staff of the D.C. Board of Elections in its entirety. They were hopelessly behind, and this is an inside Washington joke, but the D.C. Board of Elections used to lose ballot boxes off trucks. (Laughter) They used to try a new punch card system every election and it

wouldn't work. Actually, they managed to conduct a decent election. But to come back to your point, Bill, I don't think we know any more, except we know sort of the same thing, that the politicians and those of us who communicate what they're saying, or try to, do not persuade much over half the American public that it makes a difference.

MOYERS: Jeff, what did Jesse Jackson do to help or hurt Walter Mondale finally?

ALDERMAN: Well, he raised black expectations, and I thought for sure that we were going to see an increase in black turnout which would have helped. We saw a slight decline, I think. I was surprised. There are a number of studies, some of which Adam is referring to, that indicated that once you get a person registered, they go out and vote, like 85% of them. Well, there was a massive effort, and every bit of information that I could gather indicated that blacks were registering in record numbers nationwide.

CLYMER: Jeff, that percentage is much lower, though, for first-time registrants. It's down around 60%.

MOYERS: What happened, do you think?

ALDERMAN: Well, that might provide part of the answer. First time registrants don't show up, and I'm talking about an average. My guess is that blacks' expectations were raised and then dashed. It was clear for quite some time that Mondale was going to lose, and they were disappointed. They didn't feel that their vote mattered.

BARNES: Bill, I think Jackson, in the general election, was clearly a negative. I ran into one of the most striking incidents while I was covering Mississippi just a couple of weeks before the election. Jesse Jackson had been very active in voter registration and campaigning for Walter Mondale, but you could scarcely find a Mondale campaign at all outside the black community, so polarized had that community become. Clearly, race had something to do with that, but there were other factors as well. The people who would come into that state and campaign for Mondale were Jesse Jackson, Coretta King, Julian Bond, and Mayor Andy Young of Atlanta. There just weren't any whites in there campaigning for him. There was no white campaign for Walter Mondale. And Jesse Jackson played a big part in that by turning off the whites, I think.

MASHEK: This has an ominous point for the future for the Democrats, too, Bill, because the Democrats must have naively thought that this registration game was going to be strictly theirs this year and that all the blacks who were newly registered, and union members, and women were going to get their numbers out. The Republicans, as Bob (Teeter) suggested earlier, went out and probably outregistered them, particularly in the South. And now in future elections, I think you're going to see a fall-off, as my colleagues say on the Democratic side, and you'll see those Republicans come back to the polls over and over.

MOYERS: What happens if the Democrats try to build a new coalition around blacks, the poor with the working class, largely deserting to the Republicans while the Republicans are appealing to the white Southerner? What are the effects of polarization on the politics of this country? And what happens to those people if the Democrats are impotent and the Republicans are indifferent?

BARNES: I think clearly if that continues, the realignment will reach much more deeply in the South than it has now. It seems obvious that it will reach to the congressional level more than it will to the state and local level. However, you may see many more Republican state legislatures. If you did get a shift like that, all the way down to the bottom in the South, and the South became

solidly Republican at every level, then you would have a true realignment in this country. You would have a dramatic shift in balance from top to bottom.

CLYMER: There's something else that could happen, and it may well, although I think it would be rather bad for the country. I think that if the party of Lincoln completely ignores that piece of its heritage, the country is in worse shape. The best national chairman I ever covered was Bill Brock.

MOYERS: Bill Brock, Republican Chairman from Tennessee.

BARNES: Right. He got elected, in a fairly smarmy campaign, to the Senate and then he lost the Senate seat. Then, as Republican Party Chairman, he made a dedicated effort to try to figure out ways for the Republicans to get more black votes. It wasn't so much whether he succeeded in total or not, and he didn't succeed very dramatically, and I don't think he expected to in the short term, but there was a commitment there of which there's been very little evidence since he departed. And it was a sense on his part that this is why the party was founded and this was something it had a moral duty to try to do. And I don't see that dedication now. Maybe Bob Teeter knows better than I. But I don't see that in the current leadership of the party.

TEETER: I think that sense of commitment will be in the current leadership of the party because I think that, one, there is an acknowledgment of a serious problem in the country and it is something that they have got to address. Secondly, I think that from a practical standpoint, it's not just in the South, but it is in the areas I come from. If you look at the large northern industrial states and look at those that all had Republican governors eight or nine or ten years ago, only two or three do now. A key part of the coalition for Republicans to get elected in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois was to be able, not necessarily to carry the black vote, but to run reasonably well with blacks. And even though blacks are a smaller percentage of the total vote in those states, 10%, 11%, or 12%, than they are in the South, they have been by and large Democratic states up to now. It is essential for Republicans to attract more than they have had in the last two or three elections, the 7% or 8% or 9%, to carry those states in senatorial or gubernatorial elections.

When you look at Chuck Percy this year losing in Illinois, you see a perfect example of that. Chuck Percy ran in Illinois three times successfully before he lost this election. I think in every one of those elections, he got well over 33% of the black vote, and in one of those elections he got very close to 50% of the black vote. And this year, his black support went down to probably 12% or 13%, and he lost the election. If you go back to the 1978 gubernatorial and senatorial elections, there were five Republican candidates in those states, all of whom got more than one-third of the black vote—Thornburg, Thompson, Millican, Rhodes, and Percy. Four years later, two of them were running for re-election. Thornburg, who had gotten 50% in Pennsylvania before, dropped way back to about 10% or 12%. The same thing happened to Thompson, and Thompson almost lost the election. He only won by 5,000 votes in Illinois. And so it's just fundamental to the future of the Republican party, if they are to win statewide elections, that they can't function with the 8%, 9%, or 10% of the black vote that they have now. Always, for winning candidates in those states, they had to double that and get 16%, 18%, or 20%, if not more.

MOYERS: Can the Democrats build on their base outward, which is the purpose of politics, a tent of inclusion with the middle class if Jesse Jackson remains the spokesman for black Democrats?

BARNES: Boy, that's going to be hard, because Jackson thinks that blacks have a claim

on the ideology of the Democratic Party. And of course they do. They are the core vote. They aren't the people who have abandoned the party. They've stuck in huge majorities with Democratic candidates from top to bottom. And Jackson is going to demand, I'm sure, that the party not become a moderate party, but remain a liberal party, remain a party supporting New Deal social programs and so on. Jackson has also adopted somewhat of a third-world foreign policy which also may make problems for the Democratic Party.

HART: Bill, let me just follow up. There are two points. The first point, which I think that everybody is going to be able to see as a clue to where America's going, at least as far as the Democratic Party is concerned, is their ability to build beyond their base. If they are talking to their base, if they are clearly enmeshed in labor and black politics only, I think that you can say that the Democrats are going to be in for some hard times. The ability to have a national message that provides a vision will be a pretty good indication that they're getting ready to enter the new era. If they're unable, it probably means that they're getting hurt. Second, let me react to one other thing that was mentioned a couple of times by the journalists, and that is that somehow the Democratic Party is going to come back on the basis of a recession or hard economic times, or bigger budget deficits. That is a false comeback. Indeed, as Bob (Teeter) mentioned, Watergate in 1974 was a false comeback by the Democratic Party. Yes, they won the presidency in 1976. But the ability for the Democrats to really capture the next era has to do with getting to a question of how you deal with economic growth and how you present a picture of economic prosperity. If, indeed, the Democrats turn back and only turn back, it's probably a bad sign for the party.

MOYERS: If it seems paradoxical to any of you in the audience that seven white males are up here talking about racism, it's probably equally occurred to you that seven white males are up here about to talk about sexism. One of the interesting people on the CBS morning news, where I occasionally work, is a stagehand whose two sons, 27 and 32, also are members of the union and work there, too. Ten days to two weeks before the election, I came into the *Morning News* and they were filling out their absentee ballots. I watched them enthusiastically and waited until they had folded them into the envelopes, and I said, "Well, how did you vote?" The father refused to say, but the two sons said, "We voted for Reagan." I said, "Why?" One of them said, "I've got more take-home pay." And the other one spoke up and said, "I don't want my mother to be president." (Laughter) That is humorous, but the other one chimed in and said, "That's exactly the way I feel about it." And after they had left, the father came over to me and said, "That's really the reason they voted for Ronald Reagan. They do not want a woman vice-president." And this is, of course, part of the union makeup in this particular union because it is basically an all-male union. But to what extent, Adam and Jeff, do you find any trace of antifemale prejudice in the vote and in Ferraro's role in the final outcome?

CLYMER: That's exceptionally difficult to measure. People have been trying to measure the influence of vice-presidential candidates for a long time and the only case where the political scientists agree that there is a provable case of a vice-presidential candidate making a real difference is in the 1960 election where most of them acknowledge that Johnson's presence on the ticket was essential to carrying Texas, and that Texas was essential to Kennedy winning the election. With that caveat, the kind of fragmentary evidence we can find in

our national election poll is that the people who said that the vice-presidential candidate was one of the two most important factors from a laundry list we gave them, and that's not very many people, more of them voted for Mondale and Ferraro than voted for Reagan and Bush. Of the people who combined that choice with the debates, the people who picked out the vice-presidential candidate and the debates as the two most important things, which makes you think that they were watching Mashek and his friends in Philadelphia, they were more for Mondale and Ferraro than for Reagan and Bush. But it would be foolish to make the assumption that no other factors entered into the minds of any of these people, and that the people who gave us those things were giving us the total spectrum of what mattered to them. But that it didn't crop up in bits and pieces for other voters who had chosen some other topics first would be another dubious assumption. The net to Mondale is about eight tenths of one percent on the gap. Relatively little, but probably a slight positive influence.

ALDERMAN: I agree, it's difficult to track. In pre-election polling, we asked how important were the two vice-presidential candidates in making up your mind about president as opposed to making up your mind on the basis of the two presidential candidates. An overwhelming number, and probably it was a somewhat leading question, said the two presidential candidates. And I think that's basically what happened. But if you stop to think of it, that's not so bad. It really isn't. Geraldine Ferraro, it seems to me, was treated just about like every other vice-presidential candidate we ever had, widely ignored. (Laughter)

MASHEK: I talked to governor-elect of Vermont, Madeline Cunan, this week, and that's exactly what she said, Jeff. She said that she won the election not because she was a woman, but because she ran the conventional type of campaign. She ran two years ago against a popular incumbent and lost, but she had the tenacity to hang in there to run again. Let me also suggest that the ball may be in Mr. Teeter's party in four years, because I think that the most important thing of the Ferraro candidacy was the breakthrough aspect. Gerald Ford reminds us over and over that he came within an eyelash of taking Ann Armstrong of Texas as his running mate in 1976. As a matter of fact, some Republicans say maybe if he had taken Armstrong instead of Dole in that close election, he would have won. I wouldn't be a bit surprised to see the situation reversed in '88 and see a woman on the Republican ticket and perhaps not on the Democratic.

MOYERS: She may have been ignored largely, but she certainly wasn't in New York where the *New York Post*, for example, maintained a daily flagellation of her family's alleged ties to questionable associates of 40 years ago. She was the subject of a great deal of aggressive agitation in those areas where Catholics were concerned about her views on abortion and about the fact that, in a male-dominated church, she was a woman rising to such a position. And if you look at the literature in Catholic precincts, and if you look at the effort the *New York Post* made to stir prejudices against her, she certainly became an issue there and wasn't ignored. Did any of you find this?

CLYMER: Well, Bill, the archbishop in New York has a fairly fundamental quarrel with the governor of New York, and he had a quarrel with the Democratic vice-presidential candidate. He never referred to the governor of New York as Mario, but he constantly referred to the Democratic vice-presidential candidate as Geraldine.

BARNES: Bill, I think that the problem with Geraldine Ferraro as a vice-presidential

running mate, and on balance I think she was a net negative, although only slightly, was not one of gender, but one of ideology and geography. You heard from people here in Texas, particularily Democrats, saying, "I don't object to her because she's a woman, but because she's the wrong woman." And when you look at a vice-presidential race, I think that what Walter Mondale needed was someone from the South or Sunbelt and someone who was more conservative than he is. But what you wound up with was two northern liberals on the ticket, and many southerners and westerners felt that was just not a ticket that represented them. They wanted to be Democrats, many of them, and had there been someone else on the ticket, say Lloyd Bentsen, maybe Texans would have felt, "Well, that's more a ticket that I can identify with."

HART: I'm just going to say a word on behalf of Geraldine Ferraro now that six white males have beat up on her. (Laughter and applause) The fact of the matter is that she broke tradition. You look at the row she had to hoe, which was as tough as any vice-presidential candidate ever. Obviously her family financial situation and what she had to go through in terms of that scrutiny, whether you say that was self-inflicted or not, was damaging. But the dignity and the class with which she handled herself in comparison with George Bush, who had a free ride, is unbelievable. (Applause) That's just a point. (Laughter)

MOYERS: It does seem to me, Peter, as I said in the opening of the first session, a national election reveals many things about a country, political, cultural, and economic. I detected, saw, observed out in the country, as well as in reading, several currents of meanness and anger and bigotry in this campaign that lay beneath the surface of the respectable civility of both candidates. There was certainly a sharp edge to Jesse Jackson's reference to "Hymies" and the passions that it stirred. The attacks, the vicious attacks in the Religious Right's mail about homosexuals, the undercurrent of sexism which one could hear, not in print but from people to whom one would talk, revealed a meanness. It struck me that this was beneath its surface a very mean campaign in certain respects. And I wondered if this group detected any of this?

Down in Mississippi, Fred, I think that you were there that week when Mondale came out of the high school and his car was surrounded by students from a white segregationist academy, and epithets were hurled between them and the blacks in Mondale's entourage. I have on my desk a stack of material from a variety of sources, which we're trying to run down the source of, with really ugly attacks on homosexuals. And I wondered if any of you found any of this out there?

BARNES: Well, you found it in some states. Certainly there was gay bashing in the senate race in Texas. And I find the racial polarization of the vote in the South and other parts of the country alarming. I don't think it's a good trend in the country.

Could I take a second and respond to a couple of things Peter said? I think you're selling Walter Mondale short. It was Walter Mondale who broke tradition by asking Geraldine Ferraro to be on his ticket. And she said yes, which is what people usually say when they're asked. (Laughter) And the second thing is that I don't think George Bush got a free ride. Far from it. In the last three weeks of the campaign, he wound up as the most controversial figure, the guy whose manhood was somehow in doubt. (Laughter)

HART: But I think that was self created.

TEETER: Well, it might have been, but reporting on him turned very negative. Perhaps

he deserved it, but he became an extremely controversial figure.

MASHEK: I think the main symbol of meanness and some of the negative campaigning that you mentioned, Bill, was in the state of North Carolina. The Helms-Hunt race received most of its notoriety because of all the money that was spent, some $22 or $23 million, give or take a million, with about $10 or $12 per registered voter. But I think far more important than that was the meanness and intensity of that race between both combatants. It was not the finest hour in North Carolina politics.

MOYERS: Well, politics is not applesauce, Will Rogers said. These are different kinds of currents running, it seems to me. Let's talk about television and then come back and talk about money for a moment. Norman Ornstein, who is a political scientist at the American Enterprise Institute, and is also a consultant to CBS, says he thinks that 1984 is likely to go down as the year of the negative campaign all around the country. Here in Texas you saw it. House and Senate campaigns were marked by attacks on the candidates' morality, integrity, and character, not just on their positions on issues. And he says that the significant thing to him was not that people were doing these things, but that they worked. The negative campaigns worked dramatically in bringing someone from behind to at least a break-even contest when that candidate who was behind began to use negative campaigning. What does that say to you, John?

MASHEK: Well, I think Norman is right to the extent that it probably worked, but it isn't the first time that negative campaigning has worked. It certainly had success in some of the races in 1980. I hate to be cynical about it, but I think we'll see the usual protests about campaigns such as those Norman referred to raised in the next Congress. Legislation will be introduced to do something about it and the proliferation of money, but nothing will come of it.

HART: Bill, since I was involved in an awful lot of senate and gubernatorial races, it seemed to me that 1984 was a lot more negative. Bob (Teeter) and I have the "Peter-Teeter Show" that seems to go on in the odd years, and both of us had agreed that the pendulum was starting to swing back from 1982. We looked at certain races, New Mexico for example, in 1982 where there was a backlash to negative campaigning. Texas and Tennessee in the Senate races, the same sort of backlash. We thought, potentially, the pendulum was swinging the other way. I think the negative campaigns in 1984 were, indeed, terribly harsh, and I think you can say it reflects on the consultants as well as the candidates, but it ultimately reflects on the American public. The reason is that they really have the ability to say "No." If they look at a spot and they say, "Look, this has no place in the campaign," or "I'm repelled by it," the candidate is going to know within 24 to 48 hours. It's going to come through in the polling and in other ways. I don't know if it's the inability to articulate a positive vision that leads them to go off on a negative vision, but whatever it is, '84 really was a reversal of what I thought would happen.

MOYERS: Any other comments? I'm sure most of you on the panel know James David Barber, who's a political scientist at Duke University and a very arresting observer of the scene. He wrote recently that candidates are offering different versions of reality to the public in this campaign. And the press, by analyzing debates and campaign appearances in terms of style and political gain, rather than substance, has tutored the public to believe that what the candidates say and finding out what is true is not important. He referred specifically to Peter Teeley, press secretary to George Bush, who commented after one of the debates, "You can say anything you want during the debate

and 80 million people hear it. If reporters then document that a candidate spoke untruthfully, so what? Maybe 200 people will read it or maybe 2,000 or 20,000." And Barber said, "We have become a nation of theater critics. We have not succeeded in establishing even an elementary base to discuss the facts. I find that appalling." Any of you disagree with him?

BARNES: I wonder what Gerald Ford would say in response to Professor Barber? Certainly it was the content of his comment in the second debate in 1976 that got him in so much trouble about his view of Eastern Europe. It did matter what he said. And it didn't matter what he thought. I don't believe that Gerald Ford really believed that Poland was free of Soviet domination, yet that's what he said, and he said it twice. And that did hurt him because it was so palpably untrue.

CLYMER: I think, Bill, we're dealing with a truly singular political phenomenon in Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan has never, in his twenty-year political career, been noted for getting facts straight. (Laughter and applause) The recent Doonesbury strip in which he's quoted as saying, "Well, if you get 90% of it right, what does the other 3% matter?" (Laughter) It's true, and we have, every one of us who has covered him, written at least one piece, if not more, correcting the record on things he has said that were wrong. That doesn't persuade the public that they shouldn't vote for him. The public sees other things in Ronald Reagan that they like and that they feel comfortable with. I think a large part of the American public is perfectly aware that he doesn't get his facts straight and it doesn't matter to them.

ALDERMAN: I think that's true. We asked a question, "Who's in charge in the White House, Reagan or his advisers?" The answer was "Advisers." *The Washington Post* wrote a marvelous article on that. Then we did a follow-up by asking, "Is that a good or a bad thing?" The public said that it was a good thing. Interesting lesson on "question wording," as well.

TEETER: I think that to agree with Professor Barber in many ways is to demean the voters. This is to say that they can sit through the two or three months of a campaign, listen to them every night on the news, read about them every day in the newspaper, see their statements and their mis-statements and watch the debates, do all that and in some way not gather an accurate and true perception of just what kind of individuals and what kind of values and what kind of policies and positions are held by those two candidates. I've always been struck that, by the time you get to the end of any large-scale campaign, the voters have a pretty real view of just what kind of two people the candidates are and what they stand for. They may not love the person they're voting for, but they make a value judgment that they trust that person to go someplace and make decisions for them more than they do the other person. It seems to me that to agree with what James David Barber wrote is to do what I caution politicians not to do, and that is to underestimate the wisdom and the intelligence of the American voters. (Applause)

MOYERS: I'll have to talk to you sometime about the Doctrine of Original Sin. (Laughter)

It's at this stage that Dean Jeffrey wisely provided for the rescue of this discussion from the experts. There are microphones in the aisles. We would like for you, if you have questions to address to the panelists, to please come and address a question. I hope that you'll understand when I say that we'll lose our time and not get to the half of the football game if you make speeches before asking questions. So please ask a question and direct it to a particular panelist, who, I promise you, will give you a short answer.

QUESTION: Bill, I don't know how to ask this of one panelist, but I want to make one statement first. I'd like to thank you for noticing that this is a highly unrepresentative panel. Although many of my best friends are white, middle-aged, middle-class men, I think it's unfortunate that the wisdom on this subject is offered to us only by those people.

There are many of us who had much higher hopes for the gender gap than what was demonstrated in this election, but I do think that it had something to do with something other than "Would you vote for a woman for president?" I would like to ask those panelists who have some answers to tell us what was demonstrated about the gender gap in this election.

CLYMER: The gender gap in our numbers looks like it's about four or five points on the presidential level. We have found in tracking it in various stages over the last few years that the closer any election gets to a landslide, the more it flattens out. There are a number of senate races where the Democrats won because they got a bigger majority out of the women than the Republicans got out of the men. It's true in Michigan, it's true in Vermont, it's true in Massachusetts, and a couple more. But I don't think that, basically, the campaign was framed in those issues that seemed to generate the gender gap in the first place. I don't think that the Democrats did a very good job of pressing the concern about war and peace or the concern about fairness. In fact, I don't think the Democrats did a singularly good job in pressing almost any element of their campaign. And I think without those stimuli, and with a lot of Republican concern about how women would vote, it was reasonable to expect it to decline.

QUESTION: Is there any prospect for a significant third party? You mentioned that 47% of the electorate didn't vote and that there are divisions in the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. Now we have a Citizens Party, a Libertarian Party, and, perhaps, even another third party?

MOYERS: Jeff?

ALDERMAN: I don't think so. I think the evidence is to the contrary. I think that when Anderson decided not to run, he knew something. It's very difficult to bring off. Gallup asks a question from time to time about that and there is some support for it, but there's also support for getting rid of the Electoral College and a number of other things that I don't think are going to happen.

MOYERS: Peter and Bob, do you have anything to say about that?

TEETER: I think there are two reasons that it will not happen over the long term. First of all, it is very difficult to do. It's difficult to do attitudinally and perceptually. If you ask how much support there is for a strong two-party system, you get great answers. Second, the laws in a large number of states simply mitigate against a third party. Third, and most importantly, is that we have a winner-take-all system. We don't have a parliamentary system in this country, and there will always be too great a payoff for whoever wins for the two parties in second and third places to get together to beat whoever is in first place. We simply are not going to exist with three parties, not in our kind of system. Because here, if you get 49% of the vote, you get none of the power, zero. But in a parliamentary system, if you get 25% of the vote you may well get 25% of the power. And so I think that our system of government mitigates strongly against any lasting three-party system.

QUESTION: After Representative Ferraro was chosen as the vice-presidential candidate, Senator Bentsen said that he was going to be the last anglo male to be considered as a vice-presidential candidate by the Democratic Party. I am just curious to know if anyone agrees or disagrees with that?

HART: Totally disagree.

CLYMER: I think it's quite likely that the first woman nominated for president will seriously consider an anglo male for vice-president. (Laughter and applause)

QUESTION: It is generally accepted that the eastern media elite lean toward the Democratic Party. I'd like to poll the "goats" this morning and ask who among you voted for Mr. Reagan and who voted for Mr. Mondale? (Applause)

MOYERS: I will start first by telling you that I never reveal how I vote because you do take a vow to yourself when you move into this business. When I left the White House in 1967, I said that I will not go to any more Democratic functions and I will not contribute to the Democratic Party. I grew up a Democrat, many of my sentiments are still in that direction, but at *Newsday* when I was publisher, we endorsed one more Republican than we did Democrat. We sent almost as many Democrats to jail with investigative journalism as we did Republicans. I just simply believe that there are ways that you can develop professional skills to avoid letting your own personal experiences shape your commentary in reporting, and people would not believe you if you told them how you voted. And so I have always withheld any public knowledge of how I vote, and I really do believe that that's defensible, if not praiseworthy. (Applause)

MASHEK: It is defensible. And what happens to a reporter's credibility if they run around saying who they voted for? I think Bill is absolutely right. I think what's important is who you voted for but not who I voted for. My wife may have a hunch in most elections who I voted for, but even she doesn't know.

BARNES: The interesting thing is that I've known John (Mashek) for many years now, and I don't know who he voted for. He may know who I voted for, but I'm not going to tell you who I voted for.

MOYERS: Jeff, Adam, do you want to respond?

CLYMER: No, I think that if that's your perception in reading what we write, and not just the result of hearing some generalization about the eastern media elite, I don't feel all that elite, then it's important. But I'm not sure how it would contribute to the discussion if you knew how we voted. I think, basically, when you are in a business where your guide is to try to be as fair as you possibly can, then you should be judged by your work, and that's what I prefer to be judged by.

ALDERMAN: I'm not going to tell you either. (Laughter) I will tell you that my parents were Republicans from Massachusetts, which allowed me to know all the Republicans in the state at one time. (Laughter) Something about that belief of elitism. I view what I do at ABC as bringing the public right into the studio so they can be interrogated right on the air. I find it keeps the commentators wonderfully honest because now we have some of the answers that in the past were only speculated about. So I view polling as a kind of public-spirited thing and not an invasion of privacy, but something that really helps get the public's point of view right out into the airways.

MOYERS: I have personally not seen any evidence that supports that charge of elitism. I think that the enemy in broadcast television is brevity, not ideology. And I'm intrigued that 59% of the daily newspapers in the country in this election endorsed Ronald Reagan and 9% endorsed Walter Mondale. And I just don't see the evidence of liberal bias. I saw less evidence in this election of liberal papers pushing their point of view than I did of conservative. But let's move on. We have a lot of ground to cover.

QUESTION: I wonder what happened to us? Maybe you can help answer. About 20 years ago, I remember thinking of myself as a member of a community, an American, a neighbor (I hope a good neighbor), and then all of a sudden,

after some years, I find myself divided up. All of a sudden, I am a woman, a Catholic, an environmentalist, all kinds of bits and pieces of me. And I don't like that. You spoke of seeing yourselves maybe accused of being goats or antiheroes, and I feel sometimes that you have divided us, or at least have been somewhat responsible for dividing us up into Jews and Poles and gays and blacks and whites and rich and poor and young and old, freeze and choice and...

MOYERS: Let me put that right to Peter Hart and Bob Teeter. They're the villains here.

QUESTION: No, you all are.

MOYERS: Their handmaidens are Jeff (Alderman) and Adam (Clymer), but the rest of us have nothing to do with that. It's a very valid question though.

TEETER: Let me say that in 1980 I was working with George Bush against Ronald Reagan. In both '80 and '84, the secret of Ronald Reagan's success was that he saw the country as one country with four or five common values. If you recall, that's what he talked about almost entirely throughout his '80 campaign—values of work and family and community and church. I think that was of great advantage to him, and I think that one of the reasons that Ronald Reagan is where he is today is because he had a view of the country that really did not divide it, that treated it pretty much as a whole with some three, four, or five common values. Whether you agree with him or disagree with him, I really believe, and have all through this campaign, that was kind of fundamental to his appeal in that the country had seen itself being divided into groups.

For instance, one of the things we found in our polling about Vice-President Mondale was that one of his greatest negatives was that he was seen as promising too many things to too many separate groups. This is not necessarily a criticism of him, but I think one of the very fundamental differences between Reagan and Mondale in this campaign was where they came from and their personal view of politics, with Reagan's being much as I just described and Fritz Mondale being very much a Minnesota DFL politician. If you know very much about that, the DFL was put together by Hubert Humphrey and a number of other people by combining a series of constituencies into a coalition that amounted to over 50% to win, and it was a kind of political theory that I'm not criticizing in any way. In fact, I've employed it a large number of times. But therein is the basis of a lot of Reagan's appeal. He doesn't do that as much as the public perceives other politicians having done it for a long time.

MOYERS: Anyone want to respond to that? We've got to go on because you can see the people lined up. You can grab these people after the session and pursue it.

ALDERMAN: I'd like to jump in for just a few seconds. Politicians have been appealing to voters as Americans, but also to voters as women, or young people, or blacks, or machinists, or whatever for a long, long time—in fact, since the time we had truly nationally contested elections in the first quarter of the 19th century. And the pollsters are making it easier for them to do it. And when Bob talks about Reagan's national appeal, it's true. But Bob is looking at his appeal to Lithuanians and finding that it is the same as his appeal to Jews and the same as his appeal to men and women. It's possible to do this examination a great deal more carefully and more accurately. Indeed, there are a great many tactical elements of the Reagan campaign, as distinguished from Reagan's message, that cut the country up into more little pieces more effectively than most campaigns have ever done.

MOYERS: I'd like to stay on all of the subjects for longer than we can give the time, but to be fair we must cover more ground.

QUESTION: This is directed at Mr. Hart and Mr. Teeter, but the press can comment on it, too. It seems to me that most of the time Americans measure the importance of an issue by how much attention is given to it by the media, and I'll grant that if there's a need for polls, they should be conducted and made available to the public. What I'd like to know from you is, do you think that the press gives too much attention to these polls in their front pages and in the 30-minute nightly newscasts?

HART: I guess I would tell you that I don't think that the press has become overly fixated, and I do think that both the ABC and CBS—*New York Times* polling units have done some really interesting and ground breaking work—ABC in the area of race and CBS-*New York Times* in the area of gender and understanding those relationships. But too much emphasis is placed on the horse race by almost every polling organization and the media. What happens is that we don't really understand the underlying dynamics of an election, or what people are trying to say. I think that it's important to be able to get beyond that, and we've even taken one more dangerous step in 1984 by reducing all of the information to a single number, what is called the "spread." That obviously highlights some of the problems with polling. But the ability to use this and to understand the dynamics is a plus, and I think that some of the organizations did extremely well in 1984.

QUESTION: In view of the overwhelming outcome for Reagan, can any of you think of a single candidate who could have defeated him?

BARNES: Franklin Roosevelt. (Laughter)

MOYERS: I disagree with that. I do not think that Franklin Roosevelt would have beaten Reagan in 1984. He might have beaten him in 1932 when Reagan was eligible to run for the first time. (Laughter) I don't think anybody else would have. Does anyone disagree?

HART: Yes, outside of dealing with the cards, I think the one other potential, and not commenting on the candidate's ability, would have been to jump a generation and really set up the contrast. Then it would have been terribly interesting to see where the division would have come with young people in that different kind of situation.

MASHEK: You're talking about the race being just a little closer, though, aren't you? Are you suggesting that Gary Hart would have done a whole lot better against Reagan?

HART: The answer is, I didn't really want to get into Gary Hart or individual personalities. I guess what I would say is that there is a basic fault line in American politics in which we would have jumped a generation and created a different set of political guidelines. I think if we had jumped it in 1984, in the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party had been left with their 75 year old candidate, there might have been a very different kind of election in terms of its dynamic.

MASHEK: Well, I think Tip O'Neill said it best, and I think you can hardly characterize him as a friend of Ronald Reagan. I don't know if it's a slip of the tongue or not, but the day after the election he said, "I look upon Ronald Reagan now as the most popular political figure in U.S. history.' And he named Roosevelt and threw Eisenhower's name in, and that's what we're dealing with here.

MOYERS: Reagan is a phenomenon, and there are a lot of things beyond understanding. That happens occasionally in American politics.

QUESTION: Mr. Moyers, I think that some of us were disturbed with the analyses of

some of the debates. With this in mind, I thought I would give you a hypothetical situation and ask how you would report it, and maybe Mr. Hart and Mr. Teeter would have something to add, too. Let's say that all of these gentlemen agree before the debate that Candidate A is leading Candidate B by about 60% to 40%. Let's say that after the debate the question is asked, "Who won the debate?" Let's say that 53% of the people say that Candidate A won and 47% say that Candidate B won. My question is, who do you think won the debate and how would you report it?

MOYERS: Well, I would try to say in the immediate aftermath, as I did in fact on the air, that you cannot know who won a debate until you have done sufficient polling to find out what representative samples tell you about voters' judgment, and until the election returns are in. I am troubled by sitting in the studio the minute the debate goes off and being asked if Candidate A won or Candidate B won. Quite frankly, I don't know. I'm also troubled because it's a very limiting situation in which to try to analyze substantively what was said. People do not want to hear, for one thing, a journalist say Ronald Reagan fabricated about the Star Wars defense or that Walter Mondale fabricated about something else. I think the networks err in instant analysis, because instant analysis is usually just spontaneous opinion. (Applause) But I do think that several days later, if you believe polls about who is ahead and who is behind, you can also believe polls about who the representative sample thought won and lost the debate. If I were running a network, I would wait. I would not have instant analysis. The next night I would make a whole hour available for a really spirited discussion on who the observers thought won the debate and what the polls said. But I would do away with instant analysis.

ALDERMAN: Bill, we did that. And the numbers you just cited were almost exactly what we got, a dead heat on the final debate, according to those who saw it.

QUESTION: That's my specific point. If 60% are predisposed to vote for Reagan but only 53% say he won the debate, is it fair to say that Reagan won the debate?

CLYMER: No, and I'm not sure of the ABC reporting, but in reporting the polls we did with CBS afterwards we both emphasized the overall number, but the fact that a far greater proportion of Mondale supporters thought he won than Reagan supporters thought that he won. But the point is that we knew who these people were. They were panels and they had told us previously who they supported. So we looked to see if Reagan supporters felt as happpy with him as Mondale's felt with him.

QUESTION: This is another postmortem kind of question. Several elected Democratic officials commented the day after the election that Mondale should be faulted for abandoning traditional Democratic issues such as employment. Instead, he chose to focus on abstract but important issues like the deficit and the future. But these were things that people can't relate to, there's no image attached to them. What's your reaction to that, Mr. Hart?

HART: It's postmortem time, Bill.

MOYERS: Kind of like an autopsy.

HART: Thank you very much. It's nice to be exhumed. At any rate, I guess I would tell you that Walter Mondale did focus quite a lot on traditional Democratic issues, but at the same time the ability to take the election to Reagan meant we had to raise other issues, such as the deficit, in order to be able to get to the uncertainty about the future, the economic situation. Anecdotally, it was reported to me that the Republicans did not like us discussing the deficit, and we were gaining ground. I don't know if Bob (Teeter) felt the same way,

but at least we saw uncertainty, and it grew from a 9% issue to up to about a 17% issue around about September 20.

QUESTION: Why did Mondale drop the issue? He seemed to speak about it less as the campaign wore on.

HART: Two points. One, when we came out of Louisville, there was a different dynamic working for us. When we came out of Kansas City, we went straight back to fairness and arms control as much as anything else, because it was a situation where we were so far behind that we were looking for those things that would gain us a point here and a point there rather than the broadest kind of victory.

MOYERS: We're going to try to cover everybody and still get out on time by keeping our questions and answers brief.

QUESTION: Bill, I'd like to ask you a question first. Do you think there could exist, or does there exist another black leader that the National Black Coalition could have put forth besides Jesse Jackson? That's the first part of my question. The second part I want to address to Fred Barnes and to the other gentlemen as well. Do you have any sense of what's really going on in terms of military commitment in Central America and why is that being downplayed so much in the press?

MOYERS: My answer to your question is that leaders aren't asked to be leaders. They become leaders by asserting themselves. And I think that was the case with Jesse Jackson. He saw an opportunity and seized it. Whether anyone else who saw it and seized it would have been as effective, or as negative, with the opportunity is a hypothetical question. But he certainly saw it and moved into it and asserted himself. Fred?

BARNES: Well, on Jesse Jackson. Jackson does one thing that other black leaders don't do. He galvanizes the black community like no other black political leader in the country. It was remarkable the way the blacks turned out to vote for him. It was a true phenomenon. On the other hand, he turns off a lot of white voters. There are some blacks, like Mayor Wilson Goode of Philadelphia, for instance, who are very popular among white voters. He does not have the negatives, but also gets great black support. But he doesn't stir up the enthusiasm that Jackson does. So, if you could get a black leader who is charismatic among blacks but does not turn off white voters, he would be a remarkable figure, indeed, and would have a great future in this country.

I disagree with your second point entirely. I think that Central American news is covered extensively and I certainly read a lot about it and see a lot about it on television.

QUESTION: This question is addressed to Mr. Hart, but the rest of the panel could comment on it. I worked for the Mondale campaign at the D.C. headquarters in Washington this summer, and when I was there in May and June, we tried to get the campaign to allocate more resources for young adults. We tried to convince them that Mondale had a severe problem with young adults. We ran into a brick wall. And I subsequently found out that a lot of people, more important than we, had the same problem. They encountered a group of people whom they thought to be arrogant and insulated from the party and reality. My question is, within the structure of the party, how can we prevent a future presidential campaign from running away and hiding and cutting itself off from people who have input within the party and at the grass roots?

HART: I think it basically comes down to an experience in the Mondale campaign. Indeed, there was criticism about isolation and about not listenting to a broad-enough segment. And I think it's an experience that any other cam-

paign is going to react to. If it were to happen again in another campaign, the reaction would be stronger and quicker. I would simply say that in terms of effort with the young people, I think they did recognize the difficulties and the problems. Certainly, we were seeing what was there in the polls, but it comes back to the fact of money, time. effort, and we didn't have enough money or time to get to everything.

QUESTION: It seems to me that that was a very important group, the future of the party, and we had made a proposal for student radio ads that would have cost $20,000, which was .6% of your budget, and we got nowhere. We were very disillusioned.

HART: Everybody had a $20,000 proposal.

QUESTION: You've spoken about the polarization of the black vote in the election and also of the breakthrough of the Ferraro candidacy. My question is, and I guess it's addressed to the entire panel, to what extent did the black voters in the election remain loyal to the hope engendered by the arguably viable Jackson campaign for the presidency?

BARNES: I don't think that had much to do with it. They're just Democrats. They always vote Democratic.

MOYERS: Any different response?

ALDERMAN: Well, I think that the turnout was down, marginally down perhaps, because of the disappointment that they couldn't vote for a black candidate. They couldn't vote for a winner either.

CLYMER: On the other hand, the percentage who voted Democratic is at least as high, or perhaps a point or two higher than some exit polls in recent years have shown.

ALDERMAN: Yes, but the trend seems to be downward.

QUESTION: At the beginning of this election there was a bit made about the ability of the next president to reshape the Supreme Court and that Reagan would stack the court with conservatives. That issue seemed to be lost. Was that just a very minor issue that didn't enter into the people's decision of who they were going to vote for at all? I guess this would be to the two pollsters.

MOYERS: I understand you to be asking if the concern about the shaping of the Supreme Court after the election was a factor in the election.

TEETER: No, I don't think it was a very large factor. You would find a few people who said they were concerned about that. Those tended to be strong partisans on one side or the other. You would not find that issue a great concern to anybody whom you would identify as a marginal voter or a swing voter who would go either way. The only place we ever found it, and not to a high degree, was among people who were already strongly committed on one side or the other.

QUESTION: Even with the flak of the Jerry Falwell test of being a Christian to get onto the Supreme Court, that didn't enter into it at all?

TEETER: I think that did potentially have some small effect with some younger voters and, as said earlier here today, it may have had some small effect with Jewish voters. By and large, I don't think that issue played a major role in a large number of voters' decision making.

MOYERS: I had noticed that Tip O'Neill intends immediately after Congress convenes in January to put through a bill setting up a geriatric ward in the Supreme Court basement. (Laughter)

TEETER: You know there was one other point, and I would like Peter's thoughts on this. We did poll on that early and fairly extensively. There's another side to that argument. There was a group of people, primarily Mondale supporters,

already concerned about Reagan having potentially up to four or five appointments on the Supreme Court over the next term. But there was also a group of people in the country, and interestingly, probably more of them swing voters and a lot of them in the border states, who blamed the court for a lot of the problems we have in the country now. The argument about who would you rather have appoint the next justice or the next two or three justices was not necessarily a Mondale issue, and had it been engaged strongly in the campaign, I think it potentially might have been a Reagan issue.

QUESTION: This question is directed to Mr. Barnes, but other panelists feel free to comment as well. Earlier, you said that you did not feel that the press had done as good a job as it might have in covering the campaign, and that they were wrong on five or six issues. The question I have is, why do you feel the press did not do as good a job as it might have of covering certain issues? Was this a misperception? If, in fact, there were certain weaknesses, how might that be remedied?

BARNES: Well, I don't expect it to be remedied. A lot of the problems are ones that we're stuck with, the press being the way it is. The press usually writes about what happened yesterday or in the last few days and tends to magnify that to make it very important. Regardless of the importance of the news, there's a headline on the paper every day. It may be that there was a fire somewhere or that there was a change in government somewhere. So you're stuck with that. The press simply does not cover broader ideas. Magazines may do that. *The New Republic* or *National Review*, or other magazines may talk about that, but the press is largely uncomfortable writing about ideology. I'm talking about daily journalism now, both newspapers and television.

Television, of course, has to show something visually. It's hard to show on television the change in attitude about government over the last 20 years except by showing a poll. So there are a lot of built-in problems. And then, as Peter mentioned, I believe, there's too much emphasis on the "horse race" aspect. There's emphasis on it because it is something tangible. There is a number you can seize on, it's eight points. And it changes. The press always wants things to change. You can say, "This candidate's doing better, this candidate's doing worse, there's movement this way or that way." You don't have much of a story if you just say, "Nothing happened."

QUESTION: I'd like to follow up on the question of issues versus images, or voters as theater critics, as it was described earlier. I'm wondering why the media were not able to play the role that perhaps they should have played to help the electorate focus on the issues, to see the relationship perhaps between the deficit and the future prosperity which people were concerned about, or balance of payments and jobs, or foreign policy in Latin America and elsewhere, and future implications for this country. I don't think we can just say that Reagan's image was such a powerful one that this is a one-time phenomenon. Is it because we're relying so much on television that people are getting their impressions and arriving at their conclusions based solely on what they see, or is there some other phenomenon? I agree with the quote that Bill Moyers referred to, I think it is a dangerous trend.

MOYERS: Would you try to put that into a question?

QUESTION: Is it our reliance more on television to define the issues and difficulties that we are paying more attention to images or becoming theater critics? I'd like to hear from Bill Moyers as well as the print journalists.

MOYERS: Does anyone else have something to say first?

BARNES: I think you're right, except all the issues you mentioned are ones that were talked about a lot. I hope that my comments earlier were not misinterpreted to say that issues are not covered at all. They are written about a lot, and certainly all of the ones you mentioned are written about a lot. I don't know what your view is, but some people who were for Mondale thought that the deficit issue was not covered enough because there weren't stories in the papers saying that a horrendous recession was going to occur in 1986. But there's an argument about the effect of deficits. Some people think that they don't matter at all, some people think they matter a little, some people think they matter a lot.

MOYERS: Well, a simple answer, of course, is difficult because the media subsume many constituents, and there are local television stations and networks and so on. First, let me say that the media do dominate American politics now, at least with the images, and that includes not just the journalists, because they actually have a smaller role than the advertisers do. I think that political advertising is a source of considerable information for partisans and citizens, and it's here to stay, probably. That's not necessarily bad, because it means that the journalists don't have to do the work of the politicians for them. It means that politicians still retain some control over the information that they give to the press. If I were a politician running for office, I would not want my views filtered through Moyers or Clymer or anyone. I'd want a direct way to do it. So the media, including television, are the pervasive force in politics. I also think, though, that there is a tendency on the part of people to assume the media are the opposition. They aren't. It isn't the media's responsibility to debate the President or Mondale on deficits or anything else like that. It does seem to me we could give a lot more time, if we weren't primarily an entertainment and commercial venture, to let the candidates and their squadrons debate the issues for them. But I think my answer to your question is, yes, images have always been important in American politics, George Washington cutting down the cherry tree and all that. But I think they're more pronounced today because of the pervasive role of this mass medium.

CLYMER: Bill, could I just throw in one thought? I think that television, in doing what it does after the debates, does not do what it might have done. Most newspapers were able, by having their assorted experts on the subject on tap, to produce stories in the later editions on the Mondays following the debates that pointed out at least some of the misstatements the candidates made. And I think television should have had the same sorts of people on tap. They're just as competent as newspaper reporters to say, "When Reagan said this, he was wrong." or "When Mondale said that he was quoting a piece in the *Nation* that's been denied by all the participants," and so on. And while I think that people would have been annoyed at you, nobody likes to have the press contradicting the President or contradicting their presidential candidate, I think television should have done that while you still had the audience following the debates. (Applause)

MOYERS: I agree with you. There's a big debate about how to do it, but I agree. I think that most of the men and women in journalism are deeply troubled by the limitations and flaws and by the nature of the medium as to its capacity to be a positive force in the democratic process. We are journalists working in an entertainment medium, and journalism has to compete with entertainment. It can never compete with entertainment unless it imitates entertainment. And when it begins to imitate entertainment, it is no longer journalism. This

is a fundamental flaw that troubles most of the thoughtful men and women I know in this business.

QUESTION: I'm curious, in light of the criticism of the influence on the voters in line to vote, and certainly on the voters on the West Coast, what any of you believe is the future of exit polling and the present way that it is reported?

ALDERMAN: I think exit polling has a great future. First of all, most people that we interview do so happily, with enthusiasm, enjoy participating. We interview them after they come out of the voting booths, not before. We give them as much privacy as we can, and we learn a lot about the election because of those exit polls. And not to have that information available for on-air use or in print, or for the academics to study further, would be a terrible waste. We've had some problems in some states, and there's a lawsuit going on now in Washington state, but I think that exit polling is going to be alive and well for some time to come.

MOYERS: I feel badly about this, but some people have to leave, and we did promise that we'd be finished by 12:30, and Dean Jeffrey says we really should cut it off. Let's take two more questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Moyers, I'd like to ask you whether you think the press will stress polls less during the next election because there has been so much hostility about stressing them during this election?

MOYERS: No. I personally think that the press will contine to stress polls because politicians do, and because the polls are a source of reportage. It is information, and it is increasingly becoming more sophisticated and reliable. Yes, I think it is here to stay. In terms of exit polls, I think politicians have to change the system of voting to catch up with the technology that is now available. And there are things that can be done, times on standard closings, or Sunday voting. Yes, I think polls are here to stay. The danger is that market democracy threatens the slow, thoughtful deliberation of constitutional democracy.

QUESTION: Although journalism has to compete with entertainment, in my opinion it should be completely unbiased and impartial, and I'm sure you agree with me. Why is it, then, that we see some analysts on certain television stations who are blatantly in favor of one particular candidate, even though the latter's issues may be wrong. George Will, for example, just preaches Reaganism on TV.

MOYERS: George Will works for ABC and I think it's a very good question. (Laughter)

ALDERMAN: I think that George is hired for that reason. He does espouse a point of view like that, and we have other people on, like Tom Wicker, who counterbalance that. I don't think there's anything wrong with having commentators with a point of view. In fact, I wish there were more of that on television, because so much of it is bland and flat and deadly objective, and not very informative either.

MOYERS: I agree with that. As a journalist, myself, I would love to see more commentators, more viewpoints on the air than just a few. If there were more on CBS, for example, giving their opinions, I would be freer to speak the truth. (Laughter) And I would like to see more. But there isn't very much of it, quite frankly. I think your question presupposes a number of people on the air advocating this or that candidate. That may be true on the local stations, though I haven't seen much of it, but it certainly isn't true at the national level. And to be fair to my colleague, George Will, I haven't heard him on the air advocate Ronald Reagan. I've seen him in his column support Ronald Reagan.

I'm sorry I have to close this. I want to thank all of you. You were a very good audience.

I would like to thank the panel, and I would like to thank Governor Shivers and Bob Jeffrey and the College of Communication at The University of Texas at Austin for making this possible.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.